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Call #: BT160. H65 2000

Location: LINX

Volume:

Issue:

Year: 2000

Pages:

Journal Title: On Aquinas' Theodicy

Article Author: Michael William Holland

Article Title: On Aquinas' Theodicy

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ON AQUINAS' THEODICY

ON AQUINAS'THEODICY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

By

MICHAEL WILLIAM HOLLAND, B.A.
The University of the South, 1987

August 2000
University of Arkansas

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Agreed 
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INTRODUCTION

As the title indicates, the central topic of this paper is Aquinas' attempt to provide an answer to the so-called "Problem of Evil." What, then, is the "Problem of Evil?" It is the problem of answering the question of how, if at all, it is possible to hold consistently the following claims: 1. God exists, 2. God is all-powerful, 3. God is all-good, and 4. Evil exists. The reason why this is a legitimate question, and therefore, why there is a real problem, is that it is not prima facie obvious that these claims can be held consistently, let alone how they can be held consistently. To see why, consider the following argument:

1. If God is all-powerful, then He could prevent evil.
2. If God is all-good, then He would prevent evil.
3. Therefore, if God exists and God is both all-powerful and all-good, then evil cannot exist; and if evil exists, then either God does not exist; or, if He does exist, then, either, He is not all-powerful or not all-good.

It is my goal here to present and critique Aquinas' attempt to deal with this problem. Then, having found his theodicy lacking, I will determine whether a contemporary theodicy, namely, the "soul-making" theodicy, can be used to salvage his theodicy. I will do this in the following way. In part one I will spell out what it is for Aquinas to say of something that it is good - what is goodness, what it is to say of something that it is evil, and finally, what Aquinas takes to be the cause of evil. I then go on in part two to set forth what Aquinas means when he claims of God that He is all-good

and all-powerful. Throughout parts one and two I attempt to spell out and critique Aquinas' arguments for his views. [1] In part three I lay out Aquinas' theodicy and my reasons for why I think it fails to render consistent the four claims mentioned – why his theodicy fails. In parts four and five I turn my attention to determining whether the "soul-making" theodicy as presented by Hick can be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy. This requires determining whether it can be fitted into - used within the context of - Aquinas' theodicy and if it can whether it succeeds where Aquinas' theodicy failed. I think the "soul-making" theodicy can be fitted into Aquinas' theodicy and I attempt to show that it can in part four. However, when added to Aquinas' theodicy I do not think it succeeds in doing everything his theodicy failed to do and I give my reasons for this in part five.

PART ONE: GOOD AND EVIL

On Goodness

What, according to Aquinas, is goodness? According to Aquinas, goodness is being. In other words, Aquinas identifies goodness with being or existence. Insofar as a thing is, it is good. Aquinas supports his claim goodness is the same as being with the following argument:

1. Goodness is that which all desire.
2. All desire their own perfection.
3. Therefore, a thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect.
4. Everything is perfect insofar as it is actual.
5. Being is the actuality of every thing.
6. Therefore, goodness and being are the same.

> Goodness is what all desire. Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect, for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it is being; for being is the actuality of every thing, as is clear from the foregoing. Hence it is clear that goodness and being the same really. But goodness expresses the aspect of desirableness, which being does not express. [ST.1, Q.5, A.1]

What does Aquinas mean by "actual"? Further, why is being the actuality of everything? Today we tend to conceive of existence as either/or but not both - a thing either exists or it does not exist; it cannot both exist and not exist. To answer the previous questions we must rid ourselves of this conception of existence in favor of one which admits of degrees of existence. Aquinas follows Aristotle by answering the

question of what it is to be at all by saying "a thing." In other words, to be is to be a thing. A thing is a unity of that out of which a thing is made - stuff - and its form or essence - what it is to be that thing. For example, consider an oak tree. An oak tree is the unity of that out of which it is made - cells etc. - and what it is to be an oak tree - oak treeness. Now consider an oak seedling. Why do we call it a seedling? Because it is not actually an oak tree, for it has yet to realize fully its essence - oak treeness. It is potentially an oak tree, though not actually an oak tree. However, to the extent it has realized oak treeness, perfected the form or essence of oak treeness, it is an oak tree. Wherefore we often point to an oak seedling and say, "There is an oak tree." Yet we do this while understanding that the object to which we pointed is not really an oak tree, since it has not fully actualized the form or essence of oak treeness. Put another way, an oak seedling is in a state of becoming an oak tree. Insofar as it has yet to realize the form or essence of oak treeness it is not an oak tree. On the other hand, to the extent that it has realized/actualized what it by nature is, it is an oak tree. In general, then, for Aquinas, insofar as a thing has or has not realized/actualized what it by nature is, is the extent to which it is and is not - exists and does not exist, qua that kind of thing.

> For, following Aristotle, he maintains that `good is what all things desire', and that the desired goal for a thing is its perfection, which is a matter of actuality, and to be good is to exist. ... . The fundamental thought governing this thesis is that goodness is what is aimed at or sought, that good things are things which are wanted or attractive, that a good X is an X which has whatever features are desirable in that kind of thing. Or, as Aquinas also says, a good X is an X which achieves a degree of perfection considered as the kind of thing it is. In this sense, being a good X is being something - i.e., a thing exhibiting what is desirable considered as the kind of thing it is. ... . A thing is good insofar as it is desirable, and insofar as it is in some sense.[2]

From what has been said the first premise of the argument stated above basically means all things desire to exist - actualize their essence. This seems to be a fair assessment -things grow, people mature etc. Yet, what about suicide? Surely someone who attempts suicide is attempting the opposite of actualizing his/her nature. Further, does three really follow from one and two in the above argument? I think not. For three to follow Aquinas needs another premise, 2b - the only thing that all desire is their own perfection. As it is there could be other things which all desire. Since the only quality that restricts things from being considered good is that all desire whatever it is, goodness could be associated with potentially an infinite number of things. It does not follow, then, that goodness is identical to, the same as, being, though being may be good.

Goodness is an object of desire. As such it is an end to which things strive. Seen in this way, goodness is said to be a final cause. Further, as a proper object of desire, goodness brings about desire, and therefore, motivates us to act. Seen in this way, goodness is said to be an efficient cause - that which directly precedes the event caused. "Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. ... . Now in causing, first comes goodness and the end, moving the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly comes the form." [ST 1, Q.5, A.4]

Since goodness is identified with being, to the extent to which a thing is, it is good. "But he also argues that, even if something is not good without qualification (even if it is not wholly actual), it must be actual, and therefore good, simply by virtue of existing. In this sense, he concludes, everything that exists is good." [3] Thus all things

that are, are good, to the extent to which they are. Things are to the extent that they are actual - have realized their essence. "Every being, as being is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect, since every act is some sort of perfection, and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, every being as such is good." [ST 1, Q.5, A.3]

On Evil

At this point it seems that we are no longer confronted with a problem. For since everything that exists is good, it can be concluded that evil does not exist. According to Aquinas, however, this line of reasoning fails. To see why we must distinguish between positive and negative existence. Recall the oak seedling example from the previous section. Insofar as the seedling is – has actualized its nature – it is said to exist in the positive sense. But insofar as the seedling has yet to actualize its nature fully it possesses a lack or privation of its nature. This lack or privation is what, for Aquinas, constitutes evil. Evil, then, is a lack or privation. "No being is said to be evil, considered as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks the being of virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well." [ST 1, Q.5, A.3] Hence, evil is the lack of actuality of a thing, which is the lack of being, which is the lack of good.

Not every lack is evil. For, according to Aquinas a thing can be lacking in one of two ways. We have already seen one of these ways, namely, a thing's lacking – to whatever extent – that which it ought to have by nature. A thing that lacks something in this way is said to possess a lack in the "privative sense" or privation and this is evil. On the other hand, a thing may lack something which, by nature, it need not possess. If something is lacking in this way, then it is said to possess a lack in the "negative" sense and this is not evil. "His point is that a thing is only bad because something which ought to be there is not there. This is the sense in which he thinks evil can be said not to be."[4]

Thus, a man's lacking oak treeness is not evil nor is an oak seedling's lack of manness. However an oak seedling's lack of oak treeness is evil and so is a man's lacking manness. Thus evil is the lack of actuality proper to a thing, which is the lack of being, which is the lack of good.

> As was said above, evil indicates the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil because of not having the good belonging to something else. For instance, a man would be evil because he did not have the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness. [ST 1, Q.48, A.3]

So the oak seedling is good insofar as it is and evil insofar as it is not and so is a man.

On The Cause Of Evil

Why do things lack what they by nature ought to have? Put another way, what is the cause, if any, of evil? That there must be a cause of evil, Aquinas establishes with the following argument:

1. A thing can fall short of what it is by nature only from some cause.
2. Evil is the absence of the good of a thing.
3. The good of a thing is being what it is by nature
4. Therefore, a thing's falling short of what it is by nature is evil.
5. Therefore, evil must have a cause.

"It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fall short of its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition." [ST 1, Q.49, A.1][5]

What, then, is the cause of evil? It would seem that whatever the cause of evil is, it will be good. Aquinas even gives an argument for this claim. Good being the cause of evil seems somewhat paradoxical. Why must the cause of evil be good? Nothing cannot be the cause of anything. Put another way, the cause of evil must be or exist. Insofar as a thing is, according to Aquinas, it is good. Thus, the cause of evil must be good. "But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is being, and being, as such, is good." [ST 1, Q.49, A.1][6]

Evil comes about accidentally either in action or in a thing. If it comes about in action, then it is due to some defect in principle. By "principle" Aquinas means power or capacity to act. So, a defect in "principle" is an inability to act in a given way. However, a defect in "principle" is not just the inability to act in any given way, but rather, the inability to act in a way "proper to" the agent e.g., the inability to act in a way the agent ought to be able to act when fully actual. One way evil can come about, then, is due to the lack of a thing's being fully actual. For example, a baby cannot walk because it has yet to develop the capacity to walk, has a defect of principle. There is, on the other hand, another way a thing might have a defect in principle. It is by having a defect in an instrument by which it acts. An adult human with a broken leg cannot walk either. In this case the defect is not in the principle as such, the lack of having developed or of just having a given capacity, but rather, in the instrument by which the capacity is realized.

> In action, evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principle or the instrumental agent. Thus, the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. [ST 1, Q.48, A.1]

It is not clear to me exactly what the difference is between a defect "of the principle" and a defect "of the instrumental agent." For there seems to be an inherent relation between having a capacity and the means by which a capacity is realized, namely, failure to have the instrument by which a capacity is realized entails the failure to have that capacity. Think again about the baby who cannot walk. Why is it that the baby cannot walk? The baby cannot walk because he does not have the instrument needed to

walk e.g., legs, balance, etc. developed sufficiently enough for walking. Now consider the lame who cannot walk. Why is it that the lame cannot walk? The lame cannot walk for the same reason that the baby cannot walk, namely, because he fails to have the instrument needed to walk e.g., functioning legs. Thus, the only difference I can see that obtains between the two cases is that whereas the baby has as yet to attain the capacity to walk, the lame has attained it and subsequently lost it. In any case, Davies calls this kind of evil, evil done. "..., Aquinas argues that the evil involved in `evil done' must at one level be accounted for simply in negative terms - as a matter of there being an absence of an existing good and an absence of any good operating cause."[7]

Evil is caused in a thing either by the power of an agent or by some defect. It is caused by the power of an agent in cases where the actualization of the agent entails the corruption of the thing. This occurs in cases where the actualization of the agent necessarily entails the corruption of the form of the thing. For example, the actualization of fire on a camping trip at a place where the ground is snow covered necessarily entails the corruption of the form of snow. Davies calls this kind of evil `evil suffered.'

> First, something is the victim of `evil suffered' because there is deficiency caused by the flourishing activity of something else. .... In Aquinas's judgement, when we are faced with `evil suffered' (e.g. a sick child) we must presume that it exists because something is interfering with the victim somehow, because something is acting so as to render its victim thwarted of defective in some way, because something, in short, is being itself, and therefore flourishing, at the expense of something else. And, since Aquinas thinks that this is so, he concludes that `evil suffered' always occurs because something else is good in its own way.[8]

The corruption of the form of the snow is not the intended end (given that it makes sense to say that fire intends anything at all) of the fire. Therefore, according to Aquinas, the evil is brought about accidentally.

> It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire, but accidentally; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the introduction of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. [ST. I, Q.48, A.1][9][10]

It could be asked whether the fire's corruption of other things, say, snow, is really accidental given Aquinas' view of what it means for something to be brought about accidentally, namely, to be brought about via an action though not the intended result of the action. Consider the following example. S is in the main office of the Department of Philosophy at The University of Arkansas and acts with the intention of going to her office. S's office is not in the main office, and therefore, S must go through the doorway at the entrance of the main office to get to her office. Can S intend to go to her office without intending also to go through the doorway? Would it be rational for S to say that she intends to go to her office but does not intend to go through the doorway? Put in a more general way, given that an agent intends to reach a goal and that reaching that goal entails X - it is not possible, in whatever sense of possible that is relevant, for the agent to reach the goal without doing X - would it be rational for the agent to maintain that she

intends to reach the goal without and does not intend to do X? If the answer to this question is yes, then the fire accidentally corrupts the form of the snow. But does it not seem reasonable to say that intending to reach a goal entails intending what makes reaching that goal possible? If so, then the answer to the question is no. If the answer to the question is no, then the fire does not accidentally corrupt the snow, for the fire's intending its own realization entails its intending the corruption of the snow, since it is not possible for the fire to actualize itself without corrupting the snow. I am not sure of how to answer the question, though I am inclined to answer it negatively. The issue is of some importance, for Aquinas maintains, and rightly so, that what is good cannot deliberately cause evil. So, if what is good is the cause of evil, as Aquinas maintains, then evil must come about accidentally. Therefore, if the answer to the question is no, then what is good cannot be the cause of evil in circumstances where the evil necessarily follows from the actualization of a thing.

Interestingly there is a built in disharmony in the world insofar as there are cases where the actualization of a thing necessarily entails the corruption of another thing. It would seem, then, that evil necessarily exists. If it does, then God has made the world such that evil necessarily exists. Yet it would seem that an all-good God would not create such a world. Does it follow from this account of how evil comes about that evil necessarily exists in the world? No. Why? The arrangement of things in the world need not be such that the actualization of a thing necessarily entails the corruption of another thing. For example, it is not necessary for fire to exist in a snow covered field. What Aquinas says here does not commit him to the view that God set up the world such that it

is necessarily the case that there are circumstances in which the actualization of a thing necessarily entails the corruption of another thing. Yet what he says here does commit him to the view that God set up the world such that there are circumstances where the actualization of a thing necessarily entails the corruption of another thing. For, here, Aquinas not only is explicating the possible ways that evil can come about, but also, the ways that evil does come about, since he gives examples. "It should, I hope, be obvious from this account that there is a sense in which Aquinas thinks of God as the cause of `evil suffered'. For evil such as this is, for him, an effect of there being goodness, and he thinks of goodness in things as an effect of God." [11]

Yet does it not seem odd that an all-good God would create a world in which circumstances of this sort occur? This question leads us to another, namely, what does Aquinas mean when he claims that God is all-good? I will address this question in the next section.

As was stated above, Aquinas claims evil is caused in a thing either by the power of some agent, or by some defect. If it is caused by some defect, then the defect is either of the agent, or of the matter. "On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter" [ST 1, Q.49, A.1] How evil comes about via a defect of the agent was described above. How evil comes about via a defect of matter Aquinas does not tell us here.

PART TWO II: GOD

On God's Goodness

God has as of yet to enter the picture as a cause of evil. Does Aquinas think God is a cause of evil? If so, then how does he attempt to reconcile God's being a cause of evil with His goodness? Earlier, in the introduction, it was claimed that if God were all-good, then He would prevent evil from occurring if He were able. Of course, if He would prevent evil from occurring, then surely He would not cause it. Is God's goodness, as construed by Aquinas, such that He would prevent evil from occurring if He were able? If not, then is He a cause of evil? If so, then how is He a cause of it?

How might God be a cause of evil? As far as I can tell there are, in general, two ways God could be a cause of evil. He could be a positive cause of evil, or He could be a negative cause of evil. Positive cause, here, denotes any entity that plays a productive role in bringing about evil. Recall the fire/snow example. In that example, insofar as the fire brings about the corruption of the snow it is a positive cause of evil. Negative cause, here, denotes any entity that is aware, e.g., perceives, either of evil which already exists, or which could possibly come about, given that circumstances relevant to its coming about are maintained and perceives these circumstances, that is able and yet fails either to rid the world of that evil or prevent it from coming about.

The central question to be dealt with in this section is whether God's being all-good, as construed by Aquinas, entails He would not be either a negative or positive cause of evil. Interestingly, if God is a negative cause of evil, then Aquinas must have held that His goodness is not a sufficient condition for His preventing evil.

What, then, does it mean to say of God that He is good for Aquinas? In the section "On Goodness" it was claimed that, for Aquinas, what is good is such because it is desired. Given this, one would expect, as is actually the case, Aquinas would maintain God is good because He is desired and not merely desired, but desired by all things; and that this is at least in part what it means to say He is good. "To put it in a nutshell God, for Aquinas, is good because he is desirable and because he is perfectly actual." [12] That what is desired is good is a given for Aquinas. But why is God desired by all things?. Consider the following argument:

1. All things desire their own perfection, i.e., their own existence.

> When Aquinas speaks of desire, he is thinking of what we might call 'inclination' or 'tendency' (inclinatio or appetitus in Aquinas's Latin). His idea is that all things desire goodness ('good is what all things desire') in the sense that they are naturally drawn to their perfection, whatever that may consist in, and however varied its exemplification from case to case.
>
> In his view, each thing has by nature an appetite for or tendency to its perfection and good. Or, bearing in mind the connection he sees between being and goodness, his suggestion is that everything naturally tends to be itself. [13]

2. Everything makes its like.

3. So, the perfection of a thing will be the acquisition of a likeness of its maker.

4. Therefore, everything desires in some way to be like its maker.

5. To desire to be like one's maker constitutes desiring one's maker.

6 Hence, everything, in some way desires to be like its maker.

7. God is the first cause of all things.

8. God is desired by all things - and therefore, good.

> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection, and the perfection and form of an effect consists in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its own like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing that is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first producing cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him. [ST-I, Q.6, A.1][14]

How is it a thing's desiring to be like its maker entails it desires its maker? Aquinas tells us in the above quote that what is in the maker which is desirable is "the participation of its likeness." Now what are we to make of this? Usually when we think of desiring a thing we think of the desire to attain it. So, for example, when we say a child desires a ball, what we mean is the child wants to possess the ball. Desire qua wanting to possess something is not what Aquinas has in mind here. Rather, what Aquinas means by "the participation of its likeness" is the actualization of a quality which is qualitatively identical, though numerically distinct, with respect to a quality possessed by the maker. What constitutes "desire" for a maker, then, is the wanting by the thing made to have actualized in it a quality numerically distinct from, though qualitatively identical with, a quality possessed by the maker. So, what it means to say all things desire God is neither all things desire to possess God, nor all things desire to strip a quality away from God and possess it themselves. Rather, what Aquinas means by "all things desire God" is they desire to have actualized in themselves a quality which is numerically distinct from, though qualitatively identical with, at least one quality possessed by God. This is what I take Aquinas to mean by "similitude" in the following quote. "All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being." [ST I, Q.6, A.1]

But which qualities do things desire to actualize in themselves that God possesses? One answer to this question that can be given, following Aristotle, is things move towards god as a final end inasmuch as they desire to be at all, e.g., to be actual. For, according to Aristotle, god is the only being that is pure act. For example, a man desires the actualization in him of the form of what it is to be human, for insofar as the form is actually in him he is actually a human being. What he has in common with god, at least to some extent, is not the form of what it is to be human, but rather, being actual. For Aquinas, being actual is one of the "similitudes" which God bestows upon His creations. For insofar as He causes something to be at all He causes it to be actual, and thus, perfect and good. However, this does not seem to be the whole story, for Aquinas claims things create their like. How is Aquinas to make this determination, if what he means is their like as opposed to the likeness of others, with merely the aforesaid scenario? For any creation involves bringing a kind of thing into being, and to bring a kind of thing into being is just to make a kind of thing actual. Further, since goodness is identified with being, to make a kind of thing actual is to make it good. So regardless of whether a man creates or a fire creates, these qualities, being, actuality, and goodness, are all bestowed upon the thing made. Therefore, if what Aquinas means by the claim each thing makes its like as opposed to the likeness of others, then if being, actuality, and goodness are the only qualities he has on which to base his claim, then he has made a bad inference. For all that can be concluded from entertaining the qualities of being, actuality, and goodness is that everything makes its like. Consequently, if what Aquinas means by the claim that each thing makes its like is that it makes something similar to it

as opposed to something similar to something other than it, as I think he does, given that he realized that the inference previously mentioned is faulty, it follows that he must have been taking into consideration qualities other than being, actuality, and goodness.

Given the scenario sketched in the previous paragraph, what it means to say each thing makes its like is each maker attempts to produce in the thing made the actuality of at least some aspect of its own form or essence. So that which is made has as its essence, or form, that aspect of the maker's form which the maker attempted to produce in it. Since the perfection of a thing is the actuality of its essence, or form, in it, and all things desire their perfection; it follows that the thing made desires the actuality of that aspect of the form of the maker which the maker attempted to produce in it. In this way the thing made desires its maker. The same holds for God and His creation. Therefore, since God is the creator of all things, all things desire God.[15]

> For Aquinas, this is how it is with everything created. In his view, created things are made by God, and they all seek to be themselves (they seek their good) by acting in accordance with what God intends (has in mind) for them. For this reason Aquinas suggests that in seeking (tending to) their good, creatures are manifesting a kind of blueprint in the divine mind, that 'all things are said to be good by divine goodness, which is the pattern, source and good of all goodness. As he sees it, this means that they are seeking God. For their goal is something that lies in God as their Maker. … . God is that by virtue of which there is something rather than nothing. So he is the ultimate Maker, the ultimate desirable, the ultimate good. He is the omega because he is the alpha. He is the end (what is desirable) because he is the beginning.[16]

To the extent that a maker successfully produces in the thing made some aspect of its essence, or form, the thing made is actual, e.g., is, and therefore, good. Hence, every

maker attempts to produce that which is good. Conversely, each thing made is good insofar as it approximates, participates in, that aspect of the form of the maker the maker attempted to produce in it. The same holds for God and His creation. "Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from first exemplary, effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the likeness of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good." [ST I, Q.4, A.3] So, not only have we discovered at least in part what Aquinas means when he claims of God that He is all-good, we have also discovered one means by which Aquinas comes to the conclusion that God seeks to produce that which is good. Interestingly, this leads one to answer the question of whether God is the cause of evil negatively. For if God seeks to produce that which is good, then He does not set out to produce that which is not good. Hence, God is not a positive cause of evil.

There is another way to come to the conclusion that what God seeks to produce is good from the claim everything seeks to produce its like. From this claim it follows that God seeks to produce His like, things that are like Him.

What, then, is God like? Aquinas claims God is "essentially good." "God alone is good essentially." [ST I, Q.6, A.3] Further he maintains God's essence alone is His being. "...God only, Whose essence alone is His being." [ST I, Q.6, A.3] What are we to make of this? Recall from the section "On Goodness" that to be is to be actual and to be actual is to be perfect, e.g., to possess a perfection, namely a form. So a thing is insofar as it is perfect. Again recall from the same section the identification of being with

goodness. Hence, insofar as a thing is perfect it is good. "For everything is called good according to its perfection." [ST I, Q.6, A.3] Therefore, if God's essence is the same as His being, which is His perfection, then God's essence, at least in part, is goodness. [17]

We have contained in this article much of what is needed to get to the conclusion that God's goodness is His essence. From this conclusion, since things produce their like, it can be concluded that God attempts to produce what is good. Therefore, God is not a positive cause of evil. However, what is lacking here is his reason(s) for maintaining God's essence is His being. So, insofar as Aquinas has established the claim that God's essence is His being, he has established that God is not a positive cause of evil.

What reasons does Aquinas give for maintaining God's essence is the same as His being? Aquinas addresses this issue in ST I, Q.3, A.4. There he gives three arguments for the claim God's essence is His being, the first of which is as follows:

1. Whatever a thing has other than its essence must have a cause.
2. There are only two possible causes of that which a thing has other that its essence, namely, some exterior agent and the thing's essence.
3. Therefore, if a thing's being is other than its essence, then its being either is caused by its essence, or its being is caused by some exterior agent.
4. Nothing can be the total cause of its own being.
5. Therefore, a thing's being is not caused by its essence.
6. So, if a thing's being is not its essence, then it must be caused by some exterior agent.
7. Hence, if God's being is not His essence, then it must be caused by some exterior agent.

8. If God's being were caused by some exterior agent, then He would not be the first efficient cause of all things.

9. God is the first efficient cause of all things.

10. Therefore, God's being is not caused by some exterior agent.

11. So, God's being is not other than His essence - His being and essence are the same.

> First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused by the constituent principles of that essence (like a proper accident that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent,--as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore if the being of a thing differs from its essence, this being must be caused by some exterior agent or by the essential principles of the thing itself. Now it is impossible for a thing's being to be caused only by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own being, if its being is caused. Therefore that thing, whose being differs from its essence, must have its being caused by another. But this cannot be said of God, because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His being should differ from His essence. [ST-I, Q.3, A.4]

The second way Aquinas argues for the claim that God's essence is the same as His being is from his definition of being:

1. Being is the actuality of a form. What does this mean? What is, for Aquinas, are things, and a thing – substance – is the unity of matter and form. A thing is insofar as it possesses, has actualized in it, its essence or form. For example, a man is insofar as he actually has those qualities that make a man a man – the essential qualities, form, of humanity. His being, then, is the actuality of the form of humanity in him.

2. Hence, there is only one possible relationship that can occur between essence and being for those things in which being and essence are not the same, namely, that of potentiality to actuality - essence is to being as potentiality is to actuality.

3. Thus, those things for whom essence and being are not the same possess potential.
4. So, if God's essence were not the same as His being, then He would possess potential.
5. God is pure act.
6. Consequently, God does not possess any potential.
7. Therefore, God's essence is the same as His being.

> Second, being is the actuality of every form or nature; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as being. Therefore, being must be compared to essence, if the latter is distinct from it, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as was shown above, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from being. Therefore His essence is His being. [ST I, Q.3, A.4]

The third way that Aquinas argues for the claim that God's essence is the same as His being is from participation. His argument goes something like the following:

1. A thing that has a quality either is that quality or has that quality by participation.
2. Therefore, a thing that exists either is being or has being by participation.
3. God exists.
4. So, either God is being or He has being by participation.
5. If God has His being by participation, then He would not be the first cause of being.
6. God is the first cause of being.
7. Therefore, God does not have His being by participation.
8. It follows, then, that God just is being.
9. To say God just is being is to say that His essence and being are the same.
10. Hence, God's essence and being are the same.

> Thirdly, anything on fire either is itself fire or has caught fire. Similarly, anything that exists either is itself existence or partakes of it. Now, God, as we have seen, exists. If then he is not himself existence, and thus not by nature existent, he will only be a partaker of existence. And so he will not be the primary existent. God therefore is not only his own essence, but also his own existent. [ST I, Q.3, A.4] [18]

Aquinas thought God's essence to be the same as His being, and therefore His essence to be the same as His goodness. "God alone is good by nature. He is supremely good because, not being in any class to which others belong, he is not so much `a good such and such' as Goodness itself." [19] Further one of the major questions with which I am dealing is that of whether what it means to say that God is all-good, according to Aquinas, is consistent with the other claims involved in constructing the problem of evil, e.g., that evil exists, etc. So, for the sake of discussion let us assume that Aquinas has provided sufficient support for the claim God's essence is the same as His goodness. Is what it means to say that God is all-good for Aquinas consistent with the other claims involved in constructing the problem of evil as construed by him? On pages 22 - 24 some ways to come to the conclusion that, for Aquinas, God is not a positive cause of evil were given. Are there other ways of coming to this conclusion? Further, a question we have yet to address is whether what Aquinas means when he claims that God is all-good entails that God is not a negative cause of evil.

Before the last two questions can be addressed, what Aquinas means by "everything produces its like" must be readdressed. One way of understanding what Aquinas means by this claim is everything attempts to produce only things which are exactly like itself. For example, an oak tree, via an acorn, seems to be attempting to

recreate itself. For that matter all animals can be seen as attempting to recreate themselves in the process of reproduction. Yet there are other cases where it is clear that things are not attempting to recreate themselves. For example, when a man builds a house it is clear that he is not attempting to recreate himself, though it is probably the case that he is attempting to instantiate in the world an aspect of himself, namely, an idea of what he wants the house to be. Given there are cases where a thing clearly is not attempting to recreate itself, if what Aquinas means by the claim "all things produce their like" is all things produce only things exactly like themselves, then he is mistaken. Further, consider what is implied when this understanding is applied to God. God would attempt to produce things that are exactly like Himself. God is uncreated and the creator of all things. It follows, then, that under this interpretation of what Aquinas means by the claim that "everything produces its like" that God attempts to produce things that are creators of all things except themselves, and which are themselves uncreated. But how can this be? If it were the case, then everything would be both created and uncreated, including God. It is clear Aquinas did not want to allow for God to be a created entity. So, we have another reason for claiming this interpretation of what Aquinas means by "everything produces its like" is wrongheaded. Clearly, then this is not the correct interpretation of what Aquinas means by "everything produces its like."

What, then, does Aquinas mean by "everything produces its like?" Perhaps what he means is everything produces some aspect of its nature. For example, a man, for Aquinas, is a rational animal. Now a teacher tends to be concerned primarily with the rational aspect of her students, at least insofar as the understanding of the subject matter

being taught. So, with respect to the subject matter being taught the teacher seeks to produce in the student an aspect of her essence, namely, the cultivation of reason. The teacher, on the other hand, does not seek to produce in the student other aspects of her essential nature with respect to the understanding of the subject matter being taught. For example, a woman teacher does not seek to make a male student a female. This interpretation gets around the difficulties of the previous one with respect to God, for under this interpretation God need not seek to produce in uncreated creators of all things. Further, this view tends to coincide with the answer Aquinas would give when asked what is a given thing like, what is its "whatness" so to speak? Aquinas claims that the "whatness" of a thing is its essence. Therefore, for a thing to produce its like constitutes its producing some aspect of its "whatness," - essence.

Which qualities of His essence does God seek to produce in a given creation? Perhaps an answer to this question can be given by considering what might be taken as a legitimate objection to the view that what Aquinas means by "everything produces its like" is that everything seeks to produce some aspect of its essence in that which it produces. Consider the example mentioned above concerning the man who builds a house. It was claimed that what the man sought to produce in the thing made was his idea of the sort of house he wanted to produce. Yet is his idea of the sort of house he wants to produce part of his essence? Aquinas would say no. In what sense, then, does the builder of a house produce his like? If the only possible answer to this question is that he makes the house similar to his idea of what he wants it to be like, then either Aquinas must give up the claim that everything produces its like, or his claim concerning

what constitutes the likeness of a thing neither of which he would do. Perhaps there is another way the builder produces his like. Consider, for example, an appeal to the most basic aspect of production, namely, the bringing of a thing into being. Any thing that brings another thing into being produces good, since goodness is identified with being. Therefore, what the builder, or any creator for that matter, does is produce goodness. God, for Aquinas, is the only being that is "essentially good." Consequently, this option will not do. Therefore, since goodness is not part of the builder's essence, it follows that goodness cannot be the likeness of the builder which the builder produces in the thing made, namely, the house.

Fortunately, an appeal to this most basic aspect of creation, namely, the bringing of a thing into being, will do with respect to God, since He is "essentially good." To say God is essentially good, for Aquinas, is to say that God just is goodness. Given the identification of goodness with being, to say of God He is goodness itself is to say God is being itself, pure act. Since the most basic aspect of creating, e.g., a necessary condition for any creation, is the bringing of the thing being created into being, God cannot fail to bestow His Goodness, or being, on anything He creates. Consequently, God must at least bestow this likeness of Himself, His goodness or being, on everything He creates.[20]

Given God at least bestows the likeness of His being on that which He creates, and He is successful in doing so, it follows that He is not a positive cause of evil. Why? Within the context of Aquinas' system we must think in terms of gradations of being, e.g., to the extent that a thing is actual – possesses its essence – it is or has being. Hence, for God to bestow successfully the likeness of His being on a thing that He creates, He

must make that thing fully actual, since being pure act Himself, He is fully actual. Now that which is fully actual is not evil, for evil, as stated earlier, is the privation of being, and that which is fully actual does not lack being. Therefore, God does not create anything that is evil, e.g., is not a positive cause of evil, given that He is successful in producing in the things that He creates the likeness of His being.

But is it possible for God to be a negative cause of evil, given He is successful in producing the likeness of His being in the things He creates? Consider, for example, a hypothetical man who never fails to produce his likeness in what he makes. Regardless of whether it is possible for him to be a positive cause of evil, it is possible for him to be a negative cause of evil. For the range of things in which he produces his likeness is the sum of all the things that he makes. There will, of course, be things that lie outside this range. Given at least some of these things which lie outside this range either are evil and he could rid them of their evil by producing his like, or are potentially evil – given relevant circumstances which also lie outside the range of things made by him which he could have prevented by producing his like – then the hypothetical man is a negative cause of evil. A necessary condition for the man to be a negative cause of evil is that there be at least some things that lie outside the range of things made by him. However, nothing lies outside the range of things created by God being the creator of all things. So, God cannot be a negative cause of evil. Further, as we have seen, God would create the likeness of His being, which is goodness, in those things that He creates if He were able. So, He would prevent evil in all things if He were able. Interestingly, it also follows that God cannot prevent rid evil from those things that are evil. For God would have created

those things that are evil in such a way that they possess less evil than they actually do possess if He were able. Therefore, God is not a negative cause of evil. Hence, what Aquinas means when he claims of God that He is all-good entails He would not be either a positive or a negative cause of evil.[21]

Interestingly, the following results from what has been said in this section:

1. If God produces the likeness of His being in those things that He creates, then those things would not be evil, lack being.

2. God is the creator of all that is.

3. Therefore, if God produces the likeness of His being in those things which He creates, then evil would not exist.

4. God would create the likeness of His being in that which He creates, if He were able.

5. Therefore, if God were able to produce the likeness of His being in those things He creates, then evil would not exist.

6. It follows, then, that if evil does exist, then God cannot produce the likeness of His being in at least one of the things that He creates.

7. Yet it would seem that if God is all-powerful, then there would not be anything that He creates for which He could not produce the likeness of His being.

8. So, it would seem that it is not the case that both God is all-powerful and evil exists.

On God's Power

Given the conclusion of the last section, two questions need to be addressed. First, is what Aquinas means by "all-powerful" when he claims "God is all-powerful" consistent with his claims concerning the existence of evil, how it exists, and to what extent that it exists? Second, does Aquinas provide sufficient support for the positions he holds? Let us consider an aspect of the latter question first, namely, whether Aquinas provides sufficient support for what he means by the claim God is all-powerful.

Aquinas argues for the claim there is power in God and in Him in the highest degree as follows:

1. To the extent and way in which a thing is actual, it is an active principle of something.
2. Active power is the principle to act on things.
3. Therefore, active power is the essence of the active principle.
4. So, to the extent and the way in which a thing is actual, it is an active power.
5. God is pure act.
6. Consequently, God is an active power in the highest degree, i.e., all-powerful.

> For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something; whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above that God is pure act, absolutely and universally perfect, and completely without imperfection. Whence it is most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the nature of active principle belongs to active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the philosopher says. It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the highest degree. [ST I, Q. 25, A. 1][22]

The argument works if the premises are true, but are they? We have already seen the reasons Aquinas gives for the relationship between being actual and being able to act. However, what is his justification for claiming God is pure act? Part of what it is to be pure act is not to be in any way potential. Aquinas shows God is in no way potential by showing He is not a body composed of extended parts. Aquinas gives three arguments for the claim God is not a body composed of extended parts.[23] The first goes like this:

1. Experience tells us there has yet to be found a body which is a cause of change and is not itself changed in the process of causing change.
2. God causes change.
3. God does not change.
4. Consequently, God is not a body.

"First, experience can offer no example of a body causing change without itself being changed. Now God has been shown above to be the unchanging first cause of change. Clearly then God is not a body." [ST I, Q. 3, A.1]

Aquinas claims "experience can offer no example" in his first premise. I take it that what he means by this is it is not possible for experience to offer an example of a case where a body moves another and yet is not moved. Now, Aquinas, following Aristotle, was an empiricist. A detailed analysis of his epistemology need not be given here. Rather it will suffice to say that certainty cannot be attained by means of experience. For suppose I hold a piece of silly putty 20 meters above the ground and let go. Further suppose I time how long it takes it to hit the ground. Finally, suppose I do this several times and discover that it takes the piece of silly putty approximately 2

seconds each time to hit the ground. Given this scenario, is there any reason for me to believe that the next time I perform the experiment that it is necessarily the case that it will take the piece of silly putty 2 seconds to hit the ground? No. I do have good reason to believe that it is likely the piece of silly putty will take 2 seconds to hit the ground since it has done so each of the previous occasions that I performed the experiment. However, I do not have good reason to believe the piece of silly putty must take 2 seconds to hit the ground the next time I let go of it from 20 meters. For all I know, the laws of nature might change prior to my performing the experiment again. So, experience yields inductive support for a conclusion arrived at by means of it and does not yield deductive support. Consequently, Aquinas is not justified in making the claim that it is not possible for experience to offer a case where a body moves another body and is itself not moved from experience. Thus, for it to be possible for him to be justified in making this claim either he must be arriving at it via some other means, or he must consider it a first principle. It is not clear whether the claim is an appropriate first principle. Also it is not clear what the other means of arriving at this claim is or might be. In any case, if experience led him to his first premise, then it should have been something like what I stated as my first premise. Hence, the argument fails.

Aquinas' second argument for the claim God is not a body has two parts. In the first he argues for the claim God can be in no way be potential. In the second he argues from the claim that in bodies there is always potential to the claim God is not a body. Since, here, I am concerned with whether God is in any way potential, I shall address only the first part of the argument which goes something like this:

1. What comes to be does so from what already is, e.g., that which is actual makes that which has potential actual.

2. God is the first efficient cause of all things.

3. Therefore, He cannot come into being.

4. Therefore, God is not potential in any way.

"Secondly, in the first existent thing everything must be actual; there can be no potentiality whatsoever. Now we have seen that the first is God. In God then there can be no potentiality." [ST I, Q.3, A.1][24]

Premise three is not contained in the quote. However, it is needed to make the argument work. Does it follow from what is stated in the quote? It might if God's being uncaused follows from His being the first efficient cause of all things. The argument would go something like this:

1. Whatever comes to be must have a cause.

2. God is the first efficient cause of all things.

3. Therefore, God is not caused.

4. So, God does not come into being.

Now, does the argument presented in the previous paragraph work? It seems that it does not work. For it is reasonable to assert that if God is caused, then either He is caused by another or He is caused by Himself. So, to show God is not caused it must be shown that He is not caused by another and that He is not caused by Himself.

Self-causation, however, is ruled out by the first premise. To see why consider the following argument:

1. What comes to be does so from what already is - that which is actual, possesses a quality - makes that which is potential - that which could have a quality but does not - actual - possess that quality.

2. Self-causation, simplistically construed, occurs when an entity causes itself to possess a quality.

3. It follows, then, that self-causation requires that an entity which causes itself to possess a quality both to possess that quality - be actual with respect to the instantiation of that quality in itself, and not possess that quality - be potential with respect to the instantiation of that quality in itself.

4. But this is impossible.

5. Therefore, God's being uncaused follows from the claim that He is the first efficient cause of all things.

6. So, premise three does follow from what is stated in the quote.

From the claim God is not caused, does it follow that God is pure act, in no way potential? I do not think so. To see why, a distinction must be made, namely, between the possibility of coming to be and possessing potential. For Aquinas, there are two necessary conditions for the possibility of coming to be, having a cause and possessing potential with respect to the instantiation of a quality. However, neither of these conditions is sufficient for a thing to possess the possibility of coming to be. In other words, if a thing lacks either one of these conditions, then it is not possible for that thing

to come to be with respect to a given quality. So it is possible for a thing not to possess the possibility of coming to be, and therefore, not be in motion, and still possess one of the conditions. If one of the conditions is not met with respect to a given entity, then is the other condition not met? Since Aquinas has argued here that God is in no way potential from the claim He is not caused, the question of importance is whether a thing's being uncaused is a sufficient condition for its being in no way potential qua that thing? Again, Aquinas follows Aristotle by claiming all motion requires a cause and motion is actualization - going from potentiality to actuality. Since all motion requires a cause, it follows that any thing that is uncaused is not in motion. Therefore, if being uncaused is a sufficient condition for being in no way potential, then not being in motion is a sufficient condition for being in no way potential. However, not being in motion is not a sufficient condition for being in no way potential. To see this one need only consider something that has quit growing prior to becoming fully actual. It is not in motion, at least with respect to becoming whatever sort of thing that it is, but is in some way potential. Hence, a thing's being uncaused is not a sufficient condition for its being in no way potential qua that thing. Consequently, God's being uncaused is not a sufficient condition for His being in no way potential, qua God.

There is, however, another way the argument might go. For from the claims what comes to be must come from what is and God is the first efficient cause of all things, it follows that there must be actually in God all that potentially can be in the world. But does it follow that God is pure act from the claim there must be actually in God all that potentially can be in this world? No, for what must be shown to prove that God is pure

act is that there must be actually in God all that potentially can be and could have been in the world. However, the claim there must be actually in God all that potentially can be and could have been does not follow from the claim there must be actually in God all that potentially can be in this world. Thus, that God is pure act does not follow from the claim there must be actually in God all that can be potentially in the world. So this way of construing the argument fails. For surely the world could have been other than the way it actually is - set up differently. This is at least logically possible. Consequently, since all the argument construed this way shows is that there must be in God actually all that can potentially be in the world, it follows that God could be in a state of potentiality with respect to at least all of the logically possible ways that the world could have been.

Aquinas's third way to argue for the claim that God is not a body is from the claim God is the most excellent being:

1. Of the things that are, some are living and others are not.
2. Living things are better than nonliving things.
3. Therefore, what makes living things alive must be the more excellent part of those things which are alive.
4. If living things were alive because of their bodies, then all bodies would be alive.
5. Not all bodies are alive.
6. Hence, those things which are alive are not so because of their bodies.
7. Thus, a body cannot be the most excellent thing.
8. God is the most excellent being.
9. So, God is not a body.

> Thirdly, it is evident from what has been said that God is the most excellent of beings. A body, however, cannot be the most excellent of beings. For bodies are either living or nonliving, and of these living bodies are clearly the most excellent. Now a living body is not alive simply in virtue of being a body (other-wise all bodies would be living); it is alive because of some other principle, in our case, the soul. Such a principle will be more excel-lent than body as such. God therefore cannot be a body. [ST I, Q. 3, A. 1]

This argument fails. It does not show God is not in any way material.

It might seem odd to claim Aquinas is arguing for God's being in no way potential by means of showing that God is not a body, given the structure of the second argument. In that argument he first argues for the claim God is in no way potential and then uses the conclusion to argue for the claim God is not a body. However, in article two, for the sake of justifying a premise to an argument - that God is in no way potential - he references article one. This leads me to believe that he took article one to show God is in no way potential, and not just merely God is not a body. Further, since the arguments he gives in article one deal mainly with supporting the claim God is not a body, I take it that he inferred from this claim that God is in no way potential. If the picture I just gave is correct, then Aquinas, at least at this point, seems to have failed at his task of showing that God is all-powerful. Why? One of the premises in his argument for God's being all-powerful was God is pure act. As we have seen Aquinas attempts to show God is pure act by showing He is in no way potential and he attempts to show God is in no way potential by showing He is not a body. However, God's not being a body is not a sufficient condition for His being in no way potential. Since, if a thing's being in no way potential followed from its not being a body, then all angels would be in no way

potential. But angels are in at least some way potential. For, according to Aquinas, only God is in no way potential. Hence, Aquinas' argument for the claim God is pure act fails. Consequently, his argument for the claim God is all-powerful fails.[25]

God's being all-powerful together with there being at least one logically possible world He has not created is a somewhat perplexing situation. For if God is all-powerful, then, according to Aquinas, He must be pure act. Further, if God is all-powerful, then He could create any logically possible world other than this one. So, with respect to any logically possible world He has not created, He possesses the potential to create it/them. Hence, if God is all-powerful, and there is at least one logically possible world He has not created, then He is in at least some way potential, e.g., potential with respect to that world(s) He has not created insofar as He has the potential to create it/them. But if God possesses potential, then He is not pure act. Therefore, if God is all-powerful and there is at least one logically possible world He has not created, then He is both pure act and not pure act.

Another way to construe the problem is as follows:

1. If God is all-powerful, then He is pure act.

2. If God is all-powerful, then He could create any logically possible world.

3. Therefore, if God is all-powerful, and there is at least one logically possible world He has not created, then He possesses potential.

4. If God possesses potential, then He is not pure act.

5. Consequently, given there is at least one logically possible world He has not created, then God is all-powerful and God is not all-powerful.

One option that could be taken here for the sake of resolving this problem would be to deny there is at least one logically possible world God has not created. But this seems to be a rather odd position for anyone who claims that God is all-good, for it entails that not only did God create this world with all of the evil present in it, but also, that He created every logically possible world worse than it. More importantly, this option is not open to Aquinas. For given the conclusion of the previous section, that if God were able to produce the likeness of His being - which just is goodness - then evil would not exist, surely it follows that He has not created a world worse than ours. Consequently, provided our world is not the worse logically possible world, there is at least one logically possible world God has not created.

Consideration of what Aquinas means when he claims God is all-powerful does not seem to help. There only needs to be at least one logically possible world God has not created for the objection to work. Hence, Aquinas must not be asserting very much by claiming God is all-powerful, e.g., he would have to be asserting nothing inconsistent with the claim that God could not, and/or cannot create any world besides this world. But the sort of God that can only create this world does not seem to be the sort of God of which we would assert all-powerful.

There is a third response which just happens to be at least something like what Aquinas would have said. For a thing to be lacking of just any quality does not necessarily entail that that thing possesses potential qua that thing. With this in mind let me make the following distinction between what I shall call <u>essential potential</u> and <u>accidental potential</u>. Let me stipulate here that what I mean when I claim of a thing, S,

that it possesses essential potential = df. S possesses essential potential if and only if there is at least one quality, Q, which is such that S's actualization of Q is a necessary condition for S being fully S - Q is an essential quality of S - and, S is in a state of potentiality, to any extent, with respect to Q - has not actualized fully Q in itself. For example, an oak seedling possesses essential potential since it does not have actualized in itself fully the essence of oak treeness - its whatness. Further let me stipulate that what I mean when I claim of a thing, S, that it possesses accidental potential = df. S possesses accidental potential if and only if there is at least one quality, Q, which is such that S's actualization of Q is not a necessary condition for S being fully S - Q in not an essential quality of S - and, S is in a state of potentiality, to any extent, with respect to Q - has not actualized fully Q in itself. For example, an oak seedling possesses accidental potential since it does not have actualized in itself fully one of the qualities of what it is to be a dog. I suggest that when Aquinas claims that God is "in no way potential" that what he means is God does not possess essential potential, e.g., is in no way potential essentially. So, God's failure to create a world that is not in accordance with His nature to create does not entail He is "in any way potential." Therefore, all that is necessary for God not to be "in any way potential" is that He has created that world(s) which is in accordance with His nature for Him to create.

What sort of world(s) is in accordance with God's nature to create? A possible answer to this question can be derived from the conclusion of the previous section, that God would create "the likeness of His being if He were able." What follows from this claim? As far as I can tell what follows from this claim is that the sort of world that

would be in accordance with God's nature for Him to create is a world which consists of His duplicate. Given what Aquinas means when He asserts that God is all-powerful, does it make sense to claim of God that He creates His duplicate? No. Why? God's creating His duplicate would entail He create an uncreated being - a being that is both created and not created. So, God's creating His duplicate does not follow from the claim God would create the likeness of His being if He were able.

However, that God would create the likness of His being if He were able does entail His creating that which is closest to the likeness of His being that He can. What sort of world is closest to the likeness of God that He is able to create given what Aquinas means when he claims God is all-powerful? The sort of world that is closest to "the likeness of God" is the best of all possible worlds God is able to create. For a world that is less than the best of all possible worlds God is able to create is, by definition, not the world closest to the likeness of God that He is able to create. Since by virtue of not being the best of all possible worlds God is able to create, it follows that there must be at least one world better than it God could have created. Yet, the better a world is, - the more goodness a world possesses - the closer to the likeness of God a world is; since, God just is goodness itself. Therefore, given the conclusion of the previous section - that God would create the likeness of His being if He were able - God would create the best of all possible worlds He is able to create.

It might be objected here that this conclusion entails God cannot create only that world which is the best of all possible worlds, and thus, one world. Hence, God is not the sort of God of which it would be appropriate to attribute the quality of being all-powerful.

One possible response to this objection can be given by making a distinction between worlds which differ with respect to the extent to which they are good and worlds that are equally good yet differ with respect to the ways in which they are good. There are an infinite number of possible worlds, it might be claimed, in at least the latter direction. The word "best" does not limit God to the creation of any one world; for there are an infinite number of worlds that are open for God to create, namely, the infinite number of worlds that are in the set of worlds which possess the quality of being the closest to the likeness of His being that He is able to create. Henceforth, I shall call any world in this set a "Best Possible World." Which Best Possible World, the response might go, He creates is up to Him. Hence, though God is limited to creating a Best Possible World, it does not follow that He is limited to the creation of any one of them.

For Aquinas, God creates freely.[26] Hence, one might object, God, must create a Best possible World only if He acted on His goodness when He creates. He need not act on His goodness. Therefore, He need not create a Best Possible World when He creates. This objection does not work. For the claim God need not act on His goodness when He acts is inconsistent with both the claim He is in no way potential and the claim He is an unmoved mover. For as we have seen God's nature is the same as His goodness, e.g., God just is goodness itself. To the extent that God fails to act on His goodness when He acts, He is not good. Therefore, if God fails to act on His goodness when He acts, He is moved, namely, from act to potential. Thus, if God fails to act on His goodness when He acts, He is no longer in no way potential. Therefore, God's goodness entails that if He creates, then He must create a Best Possible World.

According to Aquinas, God creates the world. Hence, the world must be a Best Possible World. The world is a Best Possible World if and only if it is not within God's power to create a world better than it. So, Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent if and only if God cannot create a world that is better than this world.

The question of whether God is capable of creating a world better than this world is of some importance here. Of what, then, is God capable? What does Aquinas mean by "all-powerful" when he claims "God is all-powerful?" Further, is what he means by "all-powerful" consistent with the world being a Best Possible World?

What, then, does Aquinas mean when he claims God is all-powerful? For Aquinas nothing can do what is not possible. This follows from the way the word "power" is used, namely, only with respect to what is possible. So, to say of God He is "all-powerful" is to say He can do anything possible. "If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, **God can do all things**, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible, and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent" [ST I, Q.25, A.3]

What, then, is possible? Here, again, Aquinas appeals to the way the word is used to ascertain its meaning(s). The word "possible" is used in one of two ways, in relation to some power and absolutely. With respect to the former, the word denotes something agent dependent. A thing is said to be possible for an agent only if the agent possesses the power to make it happen and/or bring it into being. "Now according to the Philosopher a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First, in relation to some power; thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man." [ST I, Q.25, A.3]

With respect to the latter, the word denotes something agent independent, objective, not something possible for a thing, but rather, possible in principle, or as Aquinas puts it "absolutely." Further, what is possible in principle is anything that, when described, does not involve an inconsistent use of terms. An inconsistent use of terms occurs only if the sentence uttered and/or written is such that the subject and predicate terms are incompatible. So, for example, the sentence "A square is a circle." describes a situation that is in principle - absolutely - impossible; whereas the sentence "My cat ate something last night." does not.

> For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another: possible, if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is an ass.
> [ST I, Q.25, A.3]

Aquinas' point here is that a given state of affairs is possible only if the essential nature of the subject is consistent with the attribution of the predicate to the subject in a sentence which describes that state of affairs, and impossible otherwise. Hence, X is absolutely possible = df. the description of X does not involve and inconsistent use of terms. X is absolutely impossible = df. the description of X does involve an inconsistent use of terms. Thus, to say of God that He can do all things possible, that He is all-powerful = df. He can do anything and only that which is in principle possible - absolutely possible.

PART THREE: WELL ORDERED WORLD

On a World Well Ordered

God's goodness, as construed by Aquinas, is such that God is all-good if and only if the world He creates is a Best Absolutely Possible World, BAPW. God's power, as construed by Aquinas, is such that He can do anything and only what is absolutely possible. God creates the world. God, then, is all-good if and only if the world is a BAPW. This world is a BAPW if and only if it is absolutely impossible for God to create a world which is better than it. Consequently, God is all-good if and only if it is absolutely impossible for God to create a world which is better than this world. For Aquinas, God is all-good. So, his theodicy is logically consistent if only if it is absolutely impossible for God to create a world which is better than this world.

Two conditions must be met by Aquinas' theodicy for it to provide a sufficient reason for why there is not an absolutely possible world which is better than this world. First, it must provide a sufficient reason for why there is not at least one absolutely possible world of the same kind as and better than this world, i.e. for why the world is a Best Absolutely Possible World of its Kind - BAPWK. Second, it must provide a sufficient reason for why there is not at least one absolutely possible world not of the same kind as and better than this world.

Before proceeding, something ought to be said about what makes two worlds different in kind. So, let me stipulate here that two worlds are different in kind if and only if one of them contains a kind of thing which the other does not contain or vice versa. A world contains a kind of thing if and only if a thing of that kind exists at some

point in that world's spatial/temporal continuum. So, for example, had the world contained a kind of thing which it has never contained - say unicorns - then it would have been different in kind from the way that it actually is. Similarly, had the world failed to contain a kind of thing which it has actually contained - say cats - then it would have been different in kind with respect to the way it actually is.

Interestingly, a world's being of a certain kind is not contingent on where a particular kind of thing is located in its spatial/temporal continuum provided it is not essential to being of that kind that it bear some sort of relation to another thing of the same or different kind. Consider, a thing, T, which is a member of the class of all Hs in a W of kind M. At what point T is in the spatial/temporal continuum of a W plays no role in determining whether W is a world of kind M – W is a M - unless T's being a M requires of T that it bear some sort of relation to some other thing. Suppose T's being H requires that T exist only when there is at least one other T. In this case, there can never be only one T in W at a time. Further limitations can be added, like Hs by nature can exist at a particular time in W, or only in the presence of some other kind of thing, or only in the presence of another H, etc. However, all things considered, there must be at least one H in W for it to be a M. A W in which there are no Hs is not a M. That a world is of a kind is determined solely by the sorts of things in it.

Given the way kinds of worlds are being distinguished here, it might be objected that the second criterion mentioned above is not a necessary condition for it to be reasonable to conclude Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent. For there is potentially an infinite number of kinds of worlds which God could create. No human, however, can

take into consideration an infinite number of worlds when attempting to determine whether Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent. For this reason, it ought not be required of someone, including Aquinas, that he must show the second criterion is met by Aquinas' theodicy in order for it to be reasonable for him to conclude Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent, if it meets the first criterion. I take this to be a reasonable objection. So, for present purposes, the first criterion is the only criterion which must be met by Aquinas' theodicy for it to be reasonable to conclude it is logically consistent.

So, Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent if and only if there is not at least one absolutely possible world of the same kind as and better than this world. There is not at least one absolutely possible world of the same kind as and better than this world if and only if the world is a BAPWK.

Does Aquinas' theodicy provide a sufficient reason for why the world is BAPWK? Aquinas addresses this question when he raises the following objection. "Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has care. But we see many evils existing in things. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything." [ST I, Q.22, A.2] Aquinas thinks God does have care for everything, i.e., God's providence extends to all that is, everything. Therefore, in order to answer this objection he attempts to show how the evil in the world does not run counter to God's being all-powerful. To do this he must provide a sufficient reason why God had to create the evil in the world to make it a BAPWK. And this is exactly what he attempts to do here.

What reason(s) does Aquinas give for why God has to create the evil in the world for it to be a BAPWK? God has to create the world where things in it are well ordered, make the world a well ordered world. Further, Aquinas maintains that God has to create the evil in the world for it to be a well ordered world. Consequently, God had to create the evil in the world to make it a BAPWK. For this reason, Aquinas thinks the evil in the world, when seen from the perspective of it as a totality, is good. Since the evil in the world is a necessary condition for the world, as a totality, being as good as it is. However, Aquinas thinks the evil in the world when seen from the perspective of individual objects in it, is evil. For, with respect to the individual objects the evil is manifest in their not being fully what they are by nature, their privation of being; and, evil just is privation of being.

> It is otherwise with one who is in charge of a particular thing and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects form what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature, yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature. … . Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered; for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. [ST I, Q.22, A.2]

Why must God create the evil in the world for it to be well ordered? God creates because He desires to reproduce His perfection. "A reason can be assigned: the divine goodness willing to diffuse itself outside itself into finite participations of its sovereign perfection." [27] This is in keeping with Aquinas' claim that everything produces its like.

However, God cannot produce His duplicate, for doing so is absolutely impossible. Therefore, He must create finite creatures. It is absolutely impossible for God to create a BAPWK by means of the creation of only one species. "For a creature to represent its creator as perfectly as possible, it would have to be its equal, which is a contradiction." [28] Consequently, it is necessary for God to create more than one species in order to create a BAPWK.

> On the contrary, where it is a question of finite and created beings, it will take many such to express under the greatest possible number of aspects the simple perfection from which they proceed. The reason, therefore, for the multiplicity and variety of created things is that such multiplicity and variety are necessary to express as perfectly as creatures can the likeness of God, the creator. [29]

Since species are distinguished by their form, creating more than one species entails the creation of a hierarchy of species. In other words, God had to create a variety of species which are different by virtue of the degree of perfection they reach when fully actual. So, for example, the degree of perfection that humans can attain is higher than the degree of perfection that animals can obtain. For humans are rational by nature, whereas, animals are not rational by nature.

> The true and principal distinction which we can observe in things is their formal distinction. Now no formal distinction is possible without inequality. The forms which determine the different natures of beings, and by reason of which things are what they <u>are</u>, in the last analysis are only different quantities of perfection. This is why we can say with Aristotle that the forms of things are like numbers whose species are changed by the addition or subtraction of a unit. Since God cannot adequately express His likeness in any single species, and since He wishes to produce in being a plurality of formally distinct species, He has necessarily to produce unequal species. Hence we see that in natural things species are ordered hierarchically and arranged according to grades. [30]

God creates the world. Creating the world requires of God that He create a hierarchy of beings. This hierarchy constitutes what it is for the world to be well ordered. Therefore, the world is a well ordered world if and only if God creates the hierarchy of beings in it. Hence, the world is a BAPWK if and only if God creates the hierarchy of beings in it. It is absolutely possible for God to create the hierarchy of beings in the world if and only if He creates evil in it. Consequently, the world is a BAPWK if and only if God creates the evil in it.

On Well Ordered World Failure

Does God's having to create the good ordering of the world necessitate His creating the evil we find in the world? I think the answer to this question is no. For Aquinas, evil is the privation, or lack, in a thing of what it ought to have by nature, namely, its essence. However, the creation of the good ordering of the world does not entail the creation of any of those beings in the hierarchy such that they lack their essence. For a thing's being fully actual is not absolutely impossible. Consider, for example, an oak seedling. Its becoming an oak tree does not entail a situation the description of which entails an inconsistent use of terms, all things considered, since its becoming an oak tree constitutes its embodiment of what it ought to be by nature, oak treeness. Creating the world such that it is well ordered, then, does not necessitate the creation of evil. Hence, there is an absolutely possible world of the same kind as and better than this world, namely, an absolutely possible world of the same kind as it in which everything is fully actual. In fact, any absolutely possible world of the same kind as this world in which there is at least one thing that is more fully actual in it at some point than its corresponding thing in this world is an absolutely possible world of the same kind as this world which is better than this world. Consequently, the world is not a BAPWK. Aquinas' theodicy is logically consistent if and only if the world is a BAPWK. So Aquinas' theodicy is logically inconsistent.

According to Aquinas, the creation of fully actual things is the end God attempts to create in the world. For God creates His like. God is actuality itself - what it is to be

at all, or Being as such. Therefore, to create His like, He must create beings which are fully actual; since, God's creation is like God to the extent it is fully actual, and it is absolutely possible for God to create all of the things He creates such that they are fully actual. Thus, Aquinas must provide a sufficient reason why all the evil that exists in the world is necessary for the creation of the good ordering of the world, i.e., a sufficient reason for why God had to create the evil that is in the world in order to create the good ordering of the world. However, Aquinas does not provide such a reason. "To this question, why God chose this world, foreseeing all the evils which would in fact occur, no answer, I think can be given."[31]

Finally, Aquinas himself maintains God can create a better world than this one. "Yet God could make other things, or add to the present creation; and then there would be another and better universe." [ST I, Q.25, A.6] Hence, Aquinas' theodicy is logically inconsistent.

On Soul-Making

Aquinas' theodicy can be salvaged if his admission of the world's not being a BAPWK is ignored. His theodicy is logically consistent if and only if the world is a BAPWK. However, his theodicy failed to provide a sufficient reason for why the evil in the world is necessary for its being well ordered. Hence, it left open the possibility of there being an absolutely possible world of the same kind as and better than this world. So, it failed to show that the world is a BAPWK. Perhaps Aquinas' theodicy together with some contemporary theodicy will provide a sufficient reason for why the world is a BAPWK thereby salvaging his theodicy.

What must be true of a contemporary theodicy for it to provide a sufficient reason for why the world is a BAPWK? First, it must be absolutely possible for it to be added to, or fitted into, his theodicy. Second, it must succeed where his theodicy failed by accounting for why the evil that is in the world is necessary for its being a well ordered.

One contemporary theodicy which at least seems promising is the soul-making theodicy. What is it and can it be fitted into Aquinas' theodicy?

What is the soul-making theodicy? On this view the existence of evil in the world is necessary for the development of virtues in persons. The development of virtues in persons, soul-making, in the world, is necessary for persons to be virtuous in the best possible way. The goodness produced by the development of virtues in persons outweighs the evil necessary for their development. Hence, the balance of goodness in the world is increased by means of the soul-making. Consequently, the world is a better world than it would have been in the absence of soul-making. Therefore, far from being

blamed for the evil that exists in the world, God is to be praised for creating it, since the balance of goodness in the world is increased by it.

Why, then, does God have to create the evil in the world in order to create the goodness that results from soul-making. One reason for the necessity of evil being in the world for the sake of soul-making is that certain virtues require for their development in persons that they confront other persons who go wrong. So, for example, it is claimed I can become a forgiving person only if I commit acts of forgiveness. However, I cannot perform acts of forgiveness unless there is a person in the world to be forgiven. Forgiveness can be granted a person only if she has done something wrong, or failed to do something she was morally obliged to do. Consequently, virtues like forgiveness can develop in persons only in a world where there exist persons who go wrong in some way. But, person(s) going wrong requires evil. Therefore, the existence of evil is a necessary condition for people to develop certain virtues like forgiveness.

A second and more general reason for the necessity of evil is that there is a quality of being virtuous that can be obtained only by going through the soul-making process.

> The value-judgement that is implicitly being invoked here is that one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptations, and thus by making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state of innocence or virtue. In the former case, which is that of actual moral achievements of mankind, an individual's goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon the accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort. I suggest, then, that it is an ethically reasonable judgement, even though in the nature of the case not one that is capable of demonstrative proof, that human goodness slowly built up through personal histories of moral effort has a value in the eyes of the Creator which justifies even the long travail of the soul-making process. [32]

So, for Hick, evil is necessary for the soul-making process for persons to be virtuous, at least in part, as a result of "temptations overcome." For this reason, becoming virtuous in the world by means of the soul-making process persons are virtuous "in a richer and more valuable sense." Consequently, persons who become virtuous by means of action in the world are virtuous in a better way than those who are virtuous at the outset of their existence.[33]

Aquinas' theodicy failed to provide a sufficient reason why the evil in the world is necessary for its being well ordered. Consequently, it failed to provide a sufficient reason for why the world's lacking of any of the evil in it is absolutely impossible. If the soul-making theodicy can be added to, fitted into, Aquinas' theodicy it might provide such a reason. It might fill the gap, so to speak, in something like the following way. Persons that become virtuous by means of the soul-making process in the world are virtuous "in a richer and more valuable sense;" and, they are virtuous in this way due to "temptations overcome." So, persons being virtuous in the best possible way – fully actual – requires their souls being made in the world. Therefore, to create a well ordered world God must create persons for which soul-making can and does take place in it. The evil in the world is necessary for the soul-making of persons. Hence, God has to create the evil in the world for it to be well ordered. God has to make the world a well-ordered world for it to be a BAPWK. Consequently, God has to create the evil in the world for it to be a BAPWK.

On Habits

Given the scenario described in the previous section, an appeal to a version of the soul-making theodicy for the sake of salvaging Aquinas' theodicy is worthy of investigation. Does some version of the soul-making theodicy fit into Aquinas' theodicy? If so, then does the soul-making theodicy provide a sufficient reason for why the world's lacking any of the evil it contains is absolutely impossible?

To determine whether a theodicy fits into Aquinas' theodicy all that must be determined is whether, given Aquinas' theodicy, it is absolutely possible. Consequently, to determine whether a version of the soul-making theodicy fits into Aquinas' theodicy what must be determined is whether, given Aquinas' theodicy, it is absolutely possible. So the question to answer is that of which, if any, version of the soul-making theodicy is such that when it is added to Aquinas' theodicy is absolutely possible.

At this point an appeal to what Aquinas has to say with respect to habits needs to be made. For soul-making constitutes virtue acquisition and, according to Aquinas, all habits are either virtues or vices. "Hence no habit can be described without the qualification of good or bad figuring in its description."[34] Hence, soul-making constitutes the acquisition of good habits. What, then, are habits and how does one come to have them? It is to answering these questions that I now turn.

For Aquinas, "Habits are principles of human action." [ST I-II, Q.49, A.4] The word principle, here, means capacity to act in a certain way given certain circumstances. However, habits are not merely powers to act in a certain way given certain circumstances, they also constitute tendencies to act in a particular way given those

circumstances. Aquinas uses the word "disposition" to capture all that has been said concerning habits thus far. So, habits are dispositions to act in a certain way given certain circumstances. However, habits are not merely such dispositions. For action, according to Aquinas, implies an end toward which that which acts, or person, attempts to move. All habits, for Aquinas, when actualized, are acts with respect to a particular end, namely, the being of the person that acts, i.e., the actualization of the nature, or essence, of the person who acts. "..., habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto." [ST I-II, Q.49, A.4] Now, those dispositions when acted on promote the nature, or essence, of the person that acts, i.e., that from which acts proceed that are in accordance with, and thus promote, or bring about and maintain, the actuality of the person that acts, Aquinas calls virtues. Whereas, those dispositions which when acted on promote the privation of the nature, or essence, of the person that acts Aquinas calls vices. "For a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature, while a bad habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature." [ST I-II, Q.54, A.3]

> In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas turns directly to the topic of virtue in 1a2ae. 55ff., were he says that any virtue (virtues) is `a good quality of mind by which one lives righteously, of which no one can make bad use'. The definition by itself may not seem that illuminating, but it is easy to indicate what Aquinas is driving at. For him, virtues are what, in the last chapter, I called `dispositions'. They are abilities, tendencies, or capacities which make it easy for us to do certain things or behave in certain ways. But they are not just any old kind of disposition. For Aquinas, there can be bad dispositions leading us to act in ways which do not perfect us or help us to states of well-being of which we are capable as human beings. Virtues, by contrast, are good dispositions. They are abilities, tendencies, or capacities which help us to act in ways which contribute to our flourishing, or to our functioning to our best advantage, so that our needs as people are satisfied. `Virtue', Aquinas says, `is a habitus which is always for good.' It `is a habitus by which a person acts well'.[35]

But how is it persons either attain or fail to attain virtues? For Aquinas, persons either attain or fail to attain virtues in whatever way it is natural for them to do so. Natural habits are never acquired by persons entirely from nature; and therefore, require an "extrinsic principle" for their development. Consequently, it is natural for persons either to attain or fail to attain virtues by means of acting in the world.

> Again, in respect of both natures, [specific and individual], something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it is entirely from nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. ...But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as was stated above, may be natural both in respect of the specific nature and in respect of the individual nature: - ... . Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man , so that they be entirely from nature. [ST I-II, Q.51, A.1]

So, <u>virtues and vices are attained by persons through their action in the world</u>.

> But there is an agent in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power [will] proceed from the same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power [understanding] presenting the object; and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self evident proposition. Therefore by such acts habits are caused in agents; not indeed with the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act which is a moved mover [will]. For everything that is passive and moved by another is disposed by the action of the agent; and therefore if the acts be multiplied, a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called habit; just as the habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive power [will], according as they are moved by reason. [ST I-II, Q.51, A.2]

How, exactly, are habits established through action in the world? As we have just seen, Aquinas maintains that the apprehensive power, or understanding, presents to the appetitive power, or will, its end. In this way the understanding moves the will towards an end. Through repetition the will becomes disposed to act in a given way, towards a certain end or goal, with respect to a certain sort of situation. The disposition of the will to act in a given way, towards a certain end or goal, given a certain sort of situation just is, according to Aquinas, a habit. In this way, then, habits are formed. So, for example, in a situation where it is open to the agent to either tell the truth or lie and the agent must do one of the two, the understanding puts before the will its proper end, telling the truth, and the will either acts accordingly or fails to act accordingly. Insofar as the will is presented with many such situations and acts accordingly, tells the truth, the will becomes disposed to tell the truth when placed in such situations. Since, as we have seen, virtues are good habits, habits which when acted on lead to the actualization of human nature in the person who acts; it follows that virtues are attained by persons through action in the world which is proper to persons, i.e., leads to the actualization of persons.

For Aquinas, then, good habit formation constitutes soul-making, i.e., the becoming virtuous of persons. So, a version of the soul-making theodicy that embodies his view on how persons become virtuous, good habit formation, will fit into his theodicy.

On Voluntary Action

Are there any other restrictions to which a version of the soul-making theodicy must conform to be used in Aquinas' theodicy? For Aquinas, the action by which one becomes virtuous must be a free action, or action of the sort that Aquinas calls voluntary. "Will, as we have seen, is a matter of being drawn to things insofar as one knows them. So properly human action is a matter of moving voluntarily in light of recognized goals."[36] Becoming virtuous, then, requires voluntary action. Does this requirement add any restrictions to which a version of the soul-making must conform to be used in Aquinas' theodicy? To move towards an answer to this question the issue of whether Aquinas can be construed as an incompatibilist or as a compatibilist must be addressed.

Most often compatibilism and incompatibilism are defined in the context of the free will/determinism debate. Roughly, determinism is the view that given the state of the world at some time and the laws of nature, there is only one possible way the world can be at some time after the original time. The reason for this, it is claimed, is that the state of the world together with the laws of nature determine the way the world will be - make it impossible for the world to fail to be the it has been determined to be. Put another way, determinism is the view that given the state of the world now and the laws of nature, the state the world will be in at some time in the future cannot fail to occur. For example, given the state of the world when I began typing this sentence and the laws of nature, I could not fail to be typing exactly what I am typing now, nor can I fail to do whatever it is that I will be doing at a given time in the future. A question asked by people who deal with the free will/determinism debate is whether the free will of persons

is compatible with determinism - whether it is logically possible for both of the following claims to be true for the world; free agents exist and determinism is the case.

In general, there are two views with respect to the issue of whether it is logically consistent to maintain both there are free persons and determinism is true. On the one hand, there are those who maintain the existence of free persons is not logically consistent with determinism. This view is known as incompatibilism and those who maintain it is true are known as incompatibilists. On the other hand, there are those who maintain the existence of free persons is logically consistent with determinism. This view is known as compatibilism and those who maintain it is true are known as compatibilist.

The major difference between these two groups, which allows for them to have such different views with respect to the issue of whether the existence of free persons is compatible with determinism, is that whereas incompatibilists maintain if determinism is true, then a person could not have done other than what she did, compatibilists deny this claim. Instead, compatibilists claim a person could have done other than what she actually did, had she chosen to do other than what she actually did; and, she could have chosen differently had she been in different circumstances. This is not to say compatibilists claim the person could have done other than what she actually did if prior circumstances had been the same as when she made her original choice. Rather, it is to say, merely, if she had chosen differently, then she could have done other than what she actually did. Now, for a person to be able to have done other than what she actually did, according to the compatibilists, is for her to be free. In other words, a person is free = df.

that person could have done other than what she actually did had she chosen to do other to do other than what she actually did. Henceforth, I shall reference this definition of freedom as CDF, for compatibilist definition of freedom. Incompatibilists usually respond by claiming a person is free only if she could have chosen differently even if the prior circumstances had been the same as when she originally made her choice; and, she could not have chosen differently if determinism is true. In other words, incompatibilists claim a person is free = df. that person could have chosen differently even if the prior circumstances were the same as when she originally made her choice. Henceforth, I shall reference this definition of freedom as IDF, for incompatibilist definition of freedom.

For Aquinas, a free act is a voluntary act. What, then, is a voluntary act? Aquinas maintains for an act to be voluntary it must meet three criteria: 1. The capacity to move must be in the person. 2. The act must be committed for the sake of some end, and the source, or reason, for moving towards a particular end must be in the person. 3. The act must be committed from knowledge. Let us consider these in turn. The first simply means the source of the act, the ultimate cause of the act, must be intrinsic to the agent. For example, if I am the actor, then what moves me to act, the source of my action, must be in me. The source of the act being in me entails the origin of my act is not outside of me. Thus, it is not possible for anything in the circumstances immediately prior to my acting to be the origin of my act.

> In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts is within the agent, or in that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone; whereas, when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone." [ST I-II, Q.6, A.1]

The example of a stone falling to the ground is evidence for why the first criterion is not a sufficient condition for an act to be considered free, or voluntary. For, clearly, the stone's act of moving downward is not free. It is, however, an act the origin of which is in that which moves, namely, the stone. Why is it the act of the stone is not free? I think the answer, at least in part, is the stone did not determine for itself the end towards which it moved. So, Aquinas maintains the source of moving towards a particular end must originate in what moves. So, the stone's act is not free, since the end towards which the stone moved was imposed on it by some outside force, and therefore, it was not the stone's in the relevant sense. Finally, according to Aquinas, having knowledge of the end is a necessary condition for a person to be moved for the sake of some end. The idea is that the person who moves has in mind a goal to be attained - the end - and the desire to attain it. But a person cannot have a goal in mind without an understanding of what it is, and for a person to understand the goal just is for her to possess knowledge of the end. In this way the last two criteria are interrelated. Meeting the third condition is a necessary condition for meeting the second. "Now no being can determine its own inclination towards an end if it does not first know the end and the relation of the means to their end." [37] For Aquinas, a person's act is free only if possesses what Aristotle called `deliberate desire', namely, to possess knowledge of an end and the desire to attain that end such that both the understanding and the desire originate in the person. "Choice is a combination of a cognitive and an appetitive element. On the cognitive side, it involves deliberation, by which we discern what is to be preferred to what; on the appetitive side, it involves an attitude of assent to what is discerned by deliberation." [ST I, Q.83, A.3]

> Aquinas makes reference to a famous passage in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle says that the origin of conduct is choice, and the origin of choice is appetition plus means-end reasoning concerned with good conduct which is the end of appetition. ... . Aquinas notes that Aristotle here seems uncertain whether to assign choice to the intellect or to the will. Elsewhere, however, he unequivocally describes it as a form of appetition (NE 3, 1113a9-12), and this is the position Aquinas accepts.[38]

So, every voluntary act involves at least three stages, namely, the decision to act, the decision to act in a given way, or for a particular end; and finally, the decision to act in a particular way for that end, i.e., deciding the means to that end.

> Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Therefore such things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things that have a knowledge of an end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but act for an end. And, consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, i.e., that they act and they act for an end, the movements and acts of such things are said to be voluntary; for the term voluntary signifies that their acts and movements are from their own inclination. [ST I-II, Q.6, A.1]

Violence, which is the term Aquinas uses to denote what impedes free action, can impede free action only by preventing the attainment of a desired end. For it is outside of the person who acts, and, as such, cannot affect the her will directly. "... it is contrary to the notion of the will's own act that it should be subject to compulsion or violence."[39]

> Consequently, just as the natural is that which is done by the inclination of nature, so the voluntary is that which is done by the inclination of the will. And just as it is impossible for a thing to be violent and natural at the same time, so it is impossible for a power of the soul to be simultaneously constrained; that is violent and voluntary. But we have seen that there is something more. The will is not only free from restraint by definition, but also by necessity. To deny this truth, is to remove from human acts anything to give them a blameworthy or meritorious character. ...the will never endures necessary determination where the exercise of its act is concerned. [40]

Hence the three stages mentioned above come to be uncoerced, since violence cannot be done to the will. "But as to the wills proper act, violence cannot be done to the will ." [ST I-II, Q.6, A.4] [41] The proper acts of the will just are the willing to act, the willing to act for an end, and the willing of a particular means to that end. Finally, if violence does affect a person's act, then that act is involuntary.

According to Aquinas, the intellect moves the will. For it is by virtue of the intellect, or understanding, that the will has an end toward which it can move at all. Thus, the intellect moves the will by presenting to it its end. "... by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it." [ST I-II, Q.9, A.1] Yet, that the intellect moves the will in this way does not entail that the will fails to move itself.

> But rational nature, ..., cannot not possess an inclination of a higher order distinct from the others. Like animate beings it has within itself inclinations toward determinate objects, insofar, for example, as it is the form of a natural heavy body which tends downwards. Like the animals, it possesses an inclination capable of being moved by the exterior objects which it comprehends. But it possesses in addition an inclination not necessarily moved by the desirable objects which it apprehends and capable of being moved or not as it pleases. Its movement, consequently, is not determined by anything other than itself. [42]

Thus the picture we get from reading Aquinas is as follows. The intellect, or understanding, presents to the will its object, or end to which it can move and the means by which it can reach the end; whereas it is the will that determines which end towards which to move, initiates action, and determines the way by which the agent will attain that end. Consequently, it is by virtue of the will that an agent moves at all, moves towards a particular end and moves towards that end in a particular way; whereas, it is by virtue of the intellect that the will has an end towards which it can move and a way to move towards that end.

Given the picture, it might be thought the understanding, or reason, and the will are different faculties of a person. However, this is not the case. Rather, according to Aquinas, the will and the understanding are just different manifestations of the same capacity, or power. So, the will moves itself, and as such, is the principle of self-movement.

> Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and directs its acts, namely, in so far as the will tends to its object according to the order of reason; for the apprehensive power, [understanding or intellect or reason], presents to the appetite, [the will], its object. Accordingly, that whereby the will tends to something good, through being ordained to the end by reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of reason. Now in such matters, the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Therefore, choice is substantially, not an act of the reason, but of the will; for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently, it is evidently an act of the appetitive power, [the will]. [ST I-II, Q. 13, A.1]

According to the IDF, to say of a person she is free is to say she could have chosen differently than what she actually did even if the prior circumstances were the

same as when she originally made her choice. So, from what has been said thus far in this section, it is clear that Aquinas can be construed as an incompatibilist. For the entire process of coming to act, and then, acting for a particular end in a particular way is internal to the person, being due solely to the person's will. Consequently, since violence can enter the picture only exteriorly, as something which prevents the actualization of a volition, i.e., the attainment of the object of the will, or what is willed, namely, the end; it follows that violence cannot affect the action of the will. Finally, since violence cannot affect the action of the will, it is open to the will to determine what the end to be pursued regardless of what the prior circumstances might be.

> To suppose that the will can be forced is a contradiction of terms and absurd; hence it is completely free from constraint. Is it free from necessity? Here we must distinguish. The will is always free from necessity in the exercise of its act. We are able not to will even the Sovereign Good, because we are able to not to will to think about it. In what concerns the determination of the act, we cannot not will the Sovereign Good nor the objects of our natural dispositions while we are thinking about them. We can, however, freely choose between choose among all particular goods, including those which acquired dispositions cause us to consider to be such, without any of them being able to determine the movement of our will. More briefly yet, the will is free to will or not to will any object whatsoever. It is always free, when it wills, to determine itself to any particular objects.[43]

It would seem that since Aquinas can be construed as an incompatibilist, he cannot be construed as a compatibilist. However, this statement is false, because Aquinas tends to use an analogy between voluntary action and the `proper' or `natural' movement of a thing in a way such that `natural' movement is a necessary condition for freedom. A `natural' movement of a thing is movement towards its actualization. Thus, the

movement of a stone towards the ground is a `natural' movement because it is `seeking' its proper place which it must attain for the sake of its actualization. For this reason all we need to know about a stone's movement in order to determine that its movement is not voluntary is that it is moving upwards. A thing's action, then, is voluntary only if its action plays a role in its actualization. Since which actions of a thing play a role in actualizing it are determined by its nature - the actualization of a thing's being, by definition, the realization in it of its nature - the end that must be willed by a thing for its act to be considered free, or voluntary, is determined by its nature. For Aquinas, God is the cause of the nature of all things, their "whatness," so to speak. Hence, only those acts which are in accordance with the will of God are free. All persons `seek' or `will' their own actualization, because of their nature.

> Like every other form, the substantial form of the human being has an essential inclination. Rational animals seek their well-being, or happiness (beatitudo), as naturally and necessarily as flames rise up. And so, Aquinas maintains, will necessarily seek happiness. ... . Moreover, since our happiness is the naturally necessitated ultimate end, considerations of it govern all volition, ...[44]

Consequently, since God determines the nature of things, He is the ultimate cause of all free acts. Hence, all free acts are determined acts. Therefore, since the IDF is not logically consistent with determinism, it follows that the only contemporary definition of freedom that fits the picture given here is the CDF. For the IDF and the CDF are defined in such a way that if anything is free in any world, it must be either incompatibilistically free or compatibilistically free. Consequently, since all things, by nature, seek their own actualization, it follows that God is an exterior cause that affects the will. "But the cause

of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone through creation, as was stated in the first part. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good." [ST I-II, Q.9, A.6] Hence, Aquinas can be construed as a compatibilist.

> Self-determination is essential; but it is compatible with divine determination. Hence Aquinas appears to believe that freedom is compatible with some sorts of determinism. Many philosophers have concurred with him in this: such philosophers are nowadays called compatibilists. ... . A compatibilist who does believe in some sort of determinism is commonly called a `soft' determinist (as opposed to a `hard' determinist, who believes not only that determinism is true but also that free will is an illusion). In contemporary terminology, Aquinas is a soft determinist: he believes that human beings are free in their actions, but he also believes that they are determined to act by God.[45]

It might be objected that the way Aquinas must be construed so that he is seen as a compatibilist fails, because it entails that no person can freely go wrong. For, as was shown above, Aquinas' being seen as a compatibilist presupposes the claim that for a thing's action to be voluntary its action must entail its actualization, at least to some extent. Therefore, since going wrong constitutes, for Aquinas, movement away from one's actualization, it follows that no thing can go freely go wrong.

Further, it might be objected the argument presented for the claim Aquinas can be construed as a compatibilist fails. For it must be the case that for all things there is only one possible way that they can actualize their nature, if the argument works. Since, if there is more than one way a thing can actualize its nature, then that thing is

incompatibilistically free with respect to how it goes about actualizing itself insofar as there is more than one path open to it that will yield its actualization. All that has been shown up to this point is that God determines what the nature of things is and this determination is consistent with there being more than one path open to things that they can take for the sake of actualizing themselves. Consequently, the argument fails.

Finally, there are scholars who maintain that, for Aquinas, God's determination goes no further than the determination of the natures of things, thereby leaving it open to things how they actualize themselves, at least with respect to persons.

> Aquinas's apparent abandonment of self-determination as the differentia of will is a significant change, but does it bring determinism or compatibilism with it. The pertinent difference between sensory and intellective apprehension is that sense, as cognizant of particulars only, presents sensuality with one object, which moves it "determinately"; rational cognition, on the other hand, cognizant of universals, "gathers several things together", thus presenting will with an array of particular goods of one sort, "and so the intellective appetite, will, can be moved by many things and not [just] by one, necessitately"(ST I.82.ad3) Moreover, since what intellect apprehends as good it presents to the will as an end (subordinate to happiness), moving will only in the manner of a final cause, intellect does not coerce will's choice. ... . So will's choice regarding particular goods collectively presented to it by intellect is free ... .[46]

Can, then, Aquinas be construed as a compatibilist? For the sake of giving Aquinas the benefit of the doubt, let us assume they do not work. Consequently, Aquinas can be construed as a compatibilist. Therefore, for all practical purposes, Aquinas can be construed either as a compatibilist or an incompatibilist. For this reason what Aquinas means when he claims of an act that it is voluntary does not place any additional restrictions on a version of the soul-making theodicy to be used in his theodicy.

PART FIVE: SALVATION

On What Must Be

Does the soul-making theodicy salvage Aquinas' theodicy? Answering this question requires addressing two more questions. First, what must the soul-making theodicy do to salvage Aquinas' theodicy? Second, does it do what it must do to salvage Aquinas' theodicy? It is to answering these questions that I now turn.

What must the soul-making theodicy do to salvage Aquinas' theodicy? Consider the following argument:

1. The world is a BAPWK if and only if all of the evil in it is necessary for its being a well ordered.

2. Aquinas' theodicy failed because it did not provide a sufficient reason for the evil in the world being necessary for its being well ordered.

3. All of the evil in the world is necessary for its being well ordered if and only if it is absolutely impossible for it to lack any of the evil in it.

4. Therefore, to salvage Aquinas' theodicy, the soul-making theodicy must provide a sufficient reason for why it is absolutely impossible for the world to be well ordered and lack any of the evil in it.

5. What and all the soul-making theodicy adds to Aquinas' theodicy is the need for evil for the soul-making of persons, i.e., soul-making evil.

6. Hence, the soul-making theodicy salvages Aquinas' theodicy if and only if it provides a sufficient reason for why it is absolutely impossible for the world to lack any of the evil in it and the soul-making of persons still take place.

In other words, to salvage Aquinas' theodicy the soul-making theodicy must provide a sufficient reason for why all of the evil in is evil necessary for the soul-making of persons, soul-making evil. If the world contains any evil which is not soul-making evil, then the soul-making theodicy fails to salvage Aquinas' theodicy. The question is whether there is any evil which is not soul-making evil in the world. All of the evil in the world is soul-making evil if and only if it is absolutely impossible for the world to lack any of it and the soul-making of persons still take place. The test, then, for whether evil is soul-making evil is whether it is absolutely impossible for the world to lack it and the soul-making of persons still take place. Again, what must be for the soul-making theodicy to salvage Aquinas' theodicy is that all of the evil in the world be soul-making evil. Is all of the evil in the world soul-making evil? I attempt to answer this question in the next section.

On What Is

Is all of the evil in the world soul-making? How to go about answering this question? Clearly, if no evil is required for the soul-making of persons, i.e., there is no soul-making evil, then not all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil. The first question to answer, then, it that of whether the world must contain evil for the soul-making of persons to take place, i.e., whether there is any soul-making evil? I begin, then, by answering this question. If there is soul-making evil, as I think there is, then what evil in the world is soul-making evil, i.e., what evil must be in the world for the soul-making of persons to take place, would seem to be the next question to answer. For knowing what evil makes possible the soul-making of persons entails knowing whether there is any evil in the world that does not make possible the soul-making of persons. It is, then, to answering the question of what evil in the world is soul-making evil that I next turn my attention. Finally, if the answering of this question points to evil that is not soul-making evil, as I think it will, then it will have been shown that not all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil.

Must the world contain evil for the soul-making of a person to occur? Is it absolutely impossible for the world to lack evil and there be soul-making of persons in it? Consider Argument One:

1. For Aquinas, a person comes to have a virtue by committing acts of the same kind as the virtue being acquired - I become courageous by committing acts of courage.

2. A person is fully actual with respect to a virtue = df. She is virtuous to the extent it is possible for a person to be virtuous with respect to that virtue.

3. A person becomes fully actual with respect to a virtue by committing a sufficient number of acts of the same kind as that virtue. So, for example, I become courageous by committing a sufficient number of acts of courage.

4. Hence, a person can become fully actual with respect to a virtue if and only if she encounters a sufficient number of situations in which she can commit acts of the same kind as the virtue being acquired for her to be able to become fully actual with respect to it. For example, I must encounter a sufficient number of situations in which I can act courageously to become fully actual with respect to courage.

5. Consequently, a person is able to become fully actual with respect to a virtue, say courage if and only if there are a sufficient number of situations in which she is and can act in accordance with that virtue, say, be courageous for her to become fully actual with respect to it – actually courageous.

6. A person is a person to the extent to which it is possible for a person to be a person, i.e., fully actual = df. for each virtue, she is fully actual.

7. Consequently, a person is able to become fully actual, if and only if, for each virtue, there are a sufficient number of situations in which she is and can act in accordance with that virtue for her to become fully actual with respect to it.

8. The world is a BAPWK if and only if every person can become fully actual.

9. So, the world is a BAPWK, if and only if, for each virtue, every person encounters a sufficient number of situations in which she is and can act in accordance with that virtue for her to become fully actual with respect to it.

10. Consider for the moment the virtue courage. The world is a BAPWK if and only if, for each person there are a sufficient number of situations in which she is and can be courageous for her to become fully actual with respect to it, i.e., actually courageous.

11. Acting courageously requires facing the potential of harm to oneself.

> For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason; and this occurs in two ways. First, when the passions incite to something against reason, and then they need curd, which is thus called temperance; secondly, when passions withdraw us from following the dictate of reason, e.g., through fear of danger or toil, and then man needs to be and to this end there is fortitude.
> [ST I-II, Q.61, A.2]

12. For a person to be harmed is evil.

13. Therefore, situations in which a person risks being harmed are situations in which there is the potential for evil.

14. All evil, according to Aquinas, is the result of some defect(s).

15. Hence, situations in which there is the potential for evil must contain at least one entity that is defective.

16. An entity is evil to the extent to which it is defective.

17. Therefore, situations for which there is the potential for evil must be such that at least one entity in them is evil.

18. Situations in which there is at least one entity that is evil possess evil.

19. So, situations for which there is the potential for evil must possess evil.

20. Hence, situations in which a person can be courageous must possess evil.

21. Consequently, the world is a BAPWK if and only if it possesses evil.

So, the world must contain evil for the soul-making of persons to take place, i.e., there is soul-making evil in it. But what evil in the world is soul-making evil? Clearly, a person must be such that her soul can be developed for the world to be an appropriate place for the soul-making of persons. Is a person's being evil necessary for her soul to be made? If so, then to what extent must a person be evil for the world to be a BAPWK?

Must a person be evil for her to be such that her soul can be made?

Consider Argument Two:

1. Virtues, according to Aquinas, are dispositions, principles, or powers of a person to act rightly, the ends of which are right actions.

> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation itself. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as are vicious habits. Others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil. ... . But virtue is a habit which is always referred to good. Hence the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil is expressed in the words by which we live righteously; and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed to good, and sometimes to evil, is expressed in the words, of which no one makes bad use. [ST I-II, Q.55, A.4]

2. The soul-making of a person = df. her process of becoming fully actual.

3. It follows, then, that the soul of a person is developed completely if and only if she is fully actual.

4. A person cannot become what she actually is. For example, I cannot become courageous if I am already actually courageous to the extent to which it is possible for a person to be courageous. Rather, I must be potentially courageous.

5. Hence, the soul of a person can be developed if and only if she is not fully actual.

6. Evil, for Aquinas, is the privation of an entity, which is to say its not being what it ought to be by nature, its essence – fully actual.

7. Therefore, a person is not fully actual if and only if she is evil.

8. Consequently, the soul of a person can be developed if and only if she is evil.

To what extent must a person be evil for the world to be a BAPWK?

Consider Argument Three:

1. The soul of a person is developed = df. she is fully actual.

2. A person is fully actual = df. with respect to each virtue she is fully actual.

3. Consequently, the soul of a person is being developed = df. there is at least one virtue for which she is in the process of becoming fully actual.

4. For a person to go through what is the entire soul-making process of a person = df. for each virtue she becomes fully actual with respect to it having been in a state of pure potentiality with respect to it - for each virtue, at some point in the world she is not at all actual and then goes on to become fully actual.

5. Evil, for Aquinas, is the privation of a entity, which is to say its not being what it ought to be by nature, not fully actual.

6. Therefore, a person is evil with respect to a virtue to the extent to which she is does not have it.

7. No person in the world can come to have that which she already has.

8. Hence, for each virtue, a person can become actual to some extent with respect to it if and only if she is to that extent evil with respect to it, i.e., potentially it.

> Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being, for good and being are convertible, as was stated in the First Part. ... . the fullness of human being requires a composite of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement; and so if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking of something due to the fullness of his being. Hence, as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness, while so far as he is lacking in the fullness of being, so far does this fall short of goodness, and is said to be evil. Thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives, and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. [ST I-II, Q.18, A.1]

9. On the soul-making defense, the extent to which a person becomes actual with respect to a virtue in the world is the extent to which she has that virtue in a "richer and more valuable way" than her being that virtue to that extent from the outset of her being.

10. So, with respect to each virtue, a person can be fully actual if and only if she can go through the entire process of coming to have it.

11. Therefore, a person can be fully actual if and only if, for each virtue, she can go through the entire process of coming to have it.

12. The world is a BAPKW if and only if each person in it can be fully actual.

13. Hence, the world is a BAPWK if and only if, or each virtue, each person in it is evil to the extent necessary for her to go through the entire process of becoming actual with respect to that virtue.

The necessity of a person being evil for her soul to be developed provides a response to one of the objections previously brought against Aquinas' theodicy. It was claimed God could create a well ordered world in which everything is always fully actual, and hence, a well ordered world in which there is no evil. The addition of the soul-making theodicy to Aquinas' theodicy, however, entails the world must contain the evil of persons necessary for them to go through the entire process of becoming fully actual.

Persons can and do go wrong, i.e., act in ways which run counter to their nature. Persons going wrong is evil. Is all of the evil of persons going wrong soul-making evil? Person(s) going wrong might be necessary for the development of their own soul or the soul of another person.

Is persons going wrong for the soul-making of their own souls soul-making evil? Consider Argument Four:

1. For each person there is at least one virtue in accordance with which she can act in every situation in which she is.

2. For each person, her soul can be developed in a situation if and only if there is at least one virtue in accordance with which she can act in that situation.

3. Hence, for each person, her soul can be developed in every situation in which she is.

4. Clearly, for each person, if her soul can be developed in every situation in which she is, then she need never go wrong to become fully actual.

5. Consequently, no person need go wrong to become fully actual.

6. It follows, then, that no persons going wrong for the soul-making of their own souls is soul-making evil.

It might be objected here that premise four of argument four is false. To see why, consider Argument Five:

1. It is possible for the soul of each person to be developed in every situation in which she is and there be at least one virtue in accordance with which she never acts.

2. Further, it is possible for the virtue in accordance with which she never acts to be such that she must go wrong in some way for its development in her.

3. So, it is possible for her soul to be developed in every situation in which she is and there be a virtue with respect to which she must go wrong to become fully actual.

4. A person soul is fully developed = df. for each virtue, she is fully actual.

5. Hence, it is possible that both her soul can be developed in every situation in which she is and she must go wrong to become fully actual.

6. Consequently, premise four of argument four is false.

However, premise two of argument five is false. For it is grounded in the claim there is at least one virtue the development of which in a person requires of her that she goes wrong in at least one situation in the world. However, there are no virtues the development of which in a person requires she go wrong in at least one situation in the world, because a person's acting in accordance with a virtue is a sufficient condition for her becoming actual with respect it, all things considered. For example, all I must do to become fully courageous is commit acts of courage.

Is person(s) going wrong necessary for the soul-making of other person(s)? Consider Argument Six:

1. "The soul-making process of each person in the world" = df. she lacks all virtue and then goes on to become fully actual.

2. A person is fully actual = df. for each virtue, she is fully actual.

3. Hence, a person can become fully actual if and only if, for each virtue, she can become fully actual.

4. According to Aquinas, a person comes to be virtuous by committing acts of the same kind as the virtue - I become forgiving by committing acts of forgiveness.

5. So, a person can become fully actual if and only if, for each virtue, it is possible for her to commit a sufficient number of acts of the same kind as that virtue for her to become fully actual. A person does not become, say forgiving, by committing one act of forgiveness. Rather, she must be forgiving consistently, when appropriate, in enough situations for her being forgiving to become second nature, i.e., a disposition of her soul.

6. If there is at least one virtue such that a person must go wrong for it to be absolutely possible for another person to become fully actual with respect to it, then, person(s) going wrong is necessary for the soul-making of each person.

7. Forgiveness is a virtue.

8. No person can forgive another who is not forgivable.

9. A person can be forgiven by another only if she has gone wrong in some way.

10. So, a person can become fully actual with respect to forgiveness, only if another person(s) has gone wrong in some way a sufficient number of times for her to commit a sufficient number of acts to become fully actual with respect to forgiveness.

11. It follows, then, that there is at least one virtue such that person(s) must go wrong for another person to become fully actual with respect to it, namely, forgiveness.

12. Hence, persons going wrong is necessary for the soul-making of persons.

Obviously, if the development of forgiveness in persons is all that for which evil is necessary, then not all of the evil that is in the world is soul-making evil.. Yet it seems that there are other virtues which are like forgiveness, i.e., such that their development in a person requires the going wrong of at least one other person, where she is affected by the going wrong of the other person in some way and the way in which she is affected

makes possible her becoming actual with respect to them. I shall call virtues of this kind relational virtues, RVs, for the possibility of their development in a person is contingent on a particular kind of relationship obtaining between the person in whom it is developed and at least one other person. So, for each virtue, it is a RV = df. a person in the world can become fully actual with respect to it only if she is affected by the going wrong of at least one other person and the way in which she is affected makes possible her becoming actual with respect to it.

Is all of the evil of persons going wrong necessary for the development of RVs? Consider Argument Seven:

1. A virtue is a RV = df. for each person, she can become actual with respect to it only if she is affected by the going wrong of is at least one other person and the way she is affected makes possible her becoming actual with respect to it.
2. Therefore, the going wrong of a person can be involved in the actualization of a RV in another person if and only if it has an affect on another.
3. Hence, if it is possible for a person to go wrong, and her going wrong affects no other person, then it is possible that not all of the evil of persons going wrong is necessary for the development of RVs in persons.
4. So, if at least one person actually does go wrong in a way that affects no other person, then not all of the evil of persons going wrong is necessary for the development of RVs.
5. Clearly, there are cases where a person's going wrong does not affect another person. Consider, for example, cases where a person goes wrong in isolation and no other person ever finds out about, and thus, affected by it etc.

6. Consequently, not all of the evil of persons going wrong necessary for the development of RVs in persons.

[NOTE: This argument can be continued in the following way.]

7. The soul-making theodicy can be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy if and only if it follows from its addition to his theodicy that the world is a BAPWK.

8. It follows from the addition of the soul-making theodicy that the world is a BAPWK if and only if all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil.

9. All of the evil in the world is soul-making evil if and only if all of evil of persons going wrong is necessary for the development of RVs in persons.

10. From #6 above and #9 it follows that not all of the evil in the world is soul-making.

11. Hence, it does not follow from the addition of the soul-making theodicy that the world is a BAPWK.

12. Consequently, the soul-making theodicy fails to salvage Aquinas' theodicy.

It might be objected that premise five of the argument is false. If premise five is false, then there are no cases of a person going wrong in isolation. Further, if there are no cases of a person going wrong in isolation, then all of the evil of persons going wrong is necessary for the development of RVs in persons. Consequently, all of the evil of persons going wrong is necessary for the development of RVs in persons.

However, the going wrong of person(s) in isolation is not necessary for there to be cases where a person's going wrong is not necessary for the soul-making of persons. For any case in which the wrongdoing of a person cannot be used by those affected by the

wrongdoing for soul-making is a case of evil that is not soul-making evil. Suppose, for example, a person wrongly takes the life of another person and that person's death affects no other person, say the person whose life is taken is homeless with no family or friends. Clearly, the wrongdoing in this case cannot be used for the soul-making of the person affected. Hence, the wrong is not soul-making evil.

It might be objected here that the wrong can be used for the soul-making of the person who goes wrong. Surely, the person is affected by her own act in some way or another. Hence, there can be no cases of wrongdoing such that the wrong cannot be used for the soul-making of at least one person. Regardless of whether the virtue which might be developed is a RV, which it would not be in cases of this nature, there is still at least the potential for the soul-making of the person who goes wrong. However, it was shown above that no one need go wrong for their own soul to be developed.

Even if all cases of persons going wrong could, and perhaps do, contribute to the soul-making of persons, it is still possible that some, if not all, of these cases are not necessary for the development of RV(s) in person(s). Hence the evil produced need not be soul-making evil. Suppose the person murdered is not homeless, but rather has a family which mourns his loss thereby contributing to their soul-making. Perhaps their souls are developed by gaining strength through tragedy. They become able and/or better able to move on productively in life despite negative events such as the death of a loved one. Also, let it be given that they forgive the person who killed their loved one. Here, then, is another way their souls are developed, i.e., the development of forgiveness. Still it does not follow that this is a case where the evil of a person going wrong is necessary

for the soul-making of persons. With the examples mentioned above in mind, consider Argument Eight:

1. The world is a BAPWK if and only if all of the evil of persons going wrong is soul-making evil.

2. Consequently, if it can be shown that there is at least one case in which the wrongdoing of a person is not soul-making evil, then the world is not a BAPWK.

3. There is at least one case where the going wrong of a person is not soul-making evil.

4. Hence, the world is not a BAPWK.

5. So, the addition of the soul-making theodicy does not entail the world is a BAPWK.

6. The soul-making theodicy alone can be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy if and only if its addition entails the world is a BAPWK.

7. Therefore, the soul-making defense alone cannot be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy.

As far as I can tell, argument eight works.

However, if you remain unconvinced, then there are reasons to believe that not all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil other than cases of persons going wrong. Consider Argument Nine:

1. If the soul-making theodicy alone can be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy, then all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil.

2. If persons going wrong is sufficient for the soul-making of persons, then natural evil is not soul-making evil.

3. If natural evil is not soul-making evil and there is natural evil in the world then, not all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil.

4. Persons going wrong is sufficient for the soul-making of persons.

5. So, natural evil is not soul-making evil.

6. There is natural evil in the world.

7. Therefore, not all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil.

8. Hence, the SMT alone cannot be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy.

As far as I can tell, argument nine works.

Consider Argument Ten:

1. On the soul-making theodicy, a person whose soul is developed in the world is virtuous in a richer and fuller way than she would have been otherwise.

2. For it is the acquisition of virtue(s) in the face of evil in the world that yields a person's possessing it/them in a richer and fuller way than she would have otherwise.

3. So, the extent to which a person's soul is developed in the world, the better she is.

4. The going through the entire soul-making process of a person = df. a person lacks all virtue at some point and then goes on to become fully actual in the world.

5. God's creating the world such that a person in it goes through the entire soul-making process is not absolutely impossible.

6. Therefore, a person is virtuous in the richest and most valuable way if and only if she goes through the entire soul-making process.

7. Consequently, the world is a BAPWK if and only if all persons go through the entire soul-making process.

8. Not all persons go through the entire soul-making process. For example, any baby that dies, and any person that is evil throughout their life are persons who do not do so.

9. So, the addition of the soul-making theodicy alone to Aquinas' theodicy does not entail the world is a BAPWK.

10. The soul-making theodicy alone salvages Aquinas theodicy if and only if its addition to his entails the world is a BAPWK.

11. Hence, the soul-making theodicy alone cannot be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy.

As far as I can tell this argument works.

Consider Argument Eleven:

1. For the world to be a BAPWK, given the addition of only the soul-making theodicy to Aquinas' theodicy, all of the evil that is in it must be soul-making evil.

2. So, if the soul-making theodicy alone can be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy, then all of the evil in the world is soul0-maknig evil.

3. If all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil, then there is no evil in it which fails to contribute to the soul-making of persons in the world.

4. Some evil in the world fails to contribute to the soul-making of persons.

5. Therefore, not all of the evil in the world is soul-making evil.

6. So, the soul-making theodicy alone cannot be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy.

It might be objected here that premise four is false. To see why it is true consider Argument Twelve:

1. By definition, for Aquinas, an evil act is one that runs counter to a person's nature.

2. A self-destructive act is an act that damages the nature of the person who commits it.

3. Obviously, an act that does damage to a person's nature is an act that runs counter to a person's nature.

4. Hence, a self-destructive act committed in isolation of which only the person who commits it ever has knowledge is evil.

5. Since it is an act of which only the person who performs ever has knowledge, it cannot be an act by means of which another person's soul can be developed.

6. So, the act does not promote the soul-making of any person.

7. Thus, the evil produced by the act is not soul-making evil.

8. Therefore, some evil in the world does not contribute to the soul-making of persons.

Also, consider any act of an animal in the wild killing another animal in the wild by which no person is ever affected. Obviously, this act produces evil, namely the death of an animal, regardless of whether the net goodness produced by it outweighs the net badness produced by it. Since no person is ever affected by the act, the evil produced by it cannot promote the soul-making of persons. Consequently, the evil produced by the act is not. Further, consider any case where a force of nature destroys some part of nature and is such that no person is ever affected by it. For example, consider a case where a tornado briefly touches down in the middle of a forest killing some trees and animals. Clearly, the touchdown of the tornado produces evil which cannot promote the soul-making of persons. Hence, the evil produced by the touchdown is not soul-making evil. All of the cases mentioned are such that the evil produced is not soul-making evil. It follows, then, that premise four of argument eleven is true. Hence, the soul-making theodicy alone cannot be used to salvage Aquinas' theodicy.

CONCLUSION

I set out to answer the questions of whether Aquinas provides sufficient support for his theodicy, whether his theodicy is consistent, and finally, if his theodicy is not consistent, whether the soul-making theodicy alone can be used to salvage it? The answer to these questions is no. Even so, all is not lost. For there are theodicies other than the soul-making theodicy. I suggest that the free will theodicy be considered next by anyone who would wish to obtain an answer to the question of whether Aquinas' theodicy is hopelessly flawed. For, as we have seen, Aquinas can be construed as a compatibilist and he can be construed as an incompatibilist. For this reason, whichever definition of freedom one wishes to take need not restrict how the free will theodicy is used to salvage his theodicy. If the free will defence alone cannot be used to salvage his theodicy, then perhaps a combination of two or more contemporary theodicies can. For example, the combination of the soul-making theodicy and the free will theodicy might do the trick. Further, what I have said concerning the soul-making theodicy can provide a blueprint for how to consider these other options. In any case, regardless of which theodicy or combination of theodicies is considered, the test for whether it can salvage Aquinas' theodicy is that of whether it provides an account for all of the evil in the world, i.e., whether all of the evil in the world is necessary for it to be the case, when fitted into Aquinas' theodicy.

END NOTES

[1]I follow Plato in maintaining that standards make judgements possible. The formulation of the problem of evil requires that one make at least two judgements, namely, with respect to the extent that the world is good and with respect to the extent to which God is good. Consequently, in order to formulate the problem of evil, there must exist a God-independent standard of goodness to which one can appeal for the sake of making these judgments. However, one of the tenets of traditional theism is that what goodness is, is determined by God. In other words, the standard of goodness is God-dependent, i.e., what the standard of goodness is, is so, because God says it is so. Hence, formulating any version of the problem of evil is a problem in itself for the traditional theist. In fact, it would seem that there is no problem of evil for the traditional theist. I have mentioned this because I think that it is an important point, even though we need not be detained by it here.

[2]Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 85-86.

[3]Davies 86.

[4]Davies 91.

[5]SCG III, C.13, Pegis Trans. Vol III, p.66

In section two Aquinas gives the following argument for the claim evil has a cause:

1. If X is in another, then either X is caused by what X in or by some outside cause.
2. Therefore, if X is in another, then X has a cause.

3. All evil is in another.

4. Thus, evil has a cause.

This is a valid argument. Are the premises true? The questionable premise is 3. Aquinas claims he has established the truth of 3 in chapter 11 where he argues that evil must be "based" on the good:

1. All that is, is good.

2. So, if evil is in anything, then it must be in something good.

3. To say evil must be in something good is to say it must be "based" on the good.

4. Consequently, if evil is in another, then it is "based" on the good.

5. Either evil exists by itself or in another.

6. If X exists by itself, then X must possess an essence.

7. Therefore, if evil exists by itself, then it must possess an essence.

8. Evil does not possess an essence.

9. Hence, evil does not exist by itself.

10. So, evil must exist in another.

11. It follows, then, that evil must be "based" on the good.

[6]SCG III, C.10, Pegis Trans. Vol III, p. 55

In section three Aquinas argues for the claim good is the cause of evil:

1. Either evil is the cause of evil, or good is the cause of evil.

2. If X is a cause, then X must be a definite thing.

3. Hence, if evil is a cause, then it must be a definite thing.

4. Evil is not a definite thing.

5. Therefore, evil is not a cause of anything.

6. Consequently, good is the cause of evil.

This argument is valid. However, premise three is questionable. Aquinas claims to have established the truth of premise three in chapter nine. Yet all he does there is attempt to refute the arguments he presents in chapter eight for the claim evil is a definite thing. These arguments, however, need not be the only arguments that can be presented for the claim evil is a definite thing. So I will not address anything in chapters eight and nine here. However, it is easy to see why Aquinas would claim evil is not a definite thing. For a thing is the composite of that out of which it is made and its essence. Evil is a privation, and as such,does not have an essence. Hence, evil cannot be a thing.

[7]Davies 95.

[8]Davies 92.

[9]SCG III, C.14, Pegis Trans. Vol III, p. 67

In section three Aquinas argues for the claim evil is an accidental cause:

1. If X is an accidental principle in a thing then it must be an accidental cause.

2. So, if evil is an accidental principle in a thing, then it is an accidental cause.

3. Evil is a privation.

4. All privations are accidental principles in the things in which they are.

5. Thus, evil is an accidental principle in the things in which it exists.

6. Consequently, evil is an accidental cause.

Interestingly, with respect to this argument, evil's being an accidental cause is not contingent upon it not being an intended end of whatever is its cause. Is this argument

sufficient for avoiding the critique I provide with respect to the argument Aquinas presents in the ST. Whether this avoids the aforesaid is contingent upon whether evil's not being an intended end of the agent is a necessary condition for its being accidentally produced. If it is a necessary condition, then the above argument fails to avoid my objection and vice versa. In section four of chapter fourteen Aquinas claims, "Now a defect in a cause is an evil. Yet, it cannot be a direct cause in itself, for a thing is not a cause by the fact that it is defective but rather by the fact that it is a being." This is inconsistent with what he says in the ST and elsewhere in the SCG where he claims evil is brought about due to some defect in the agent. In general it is not clear that Aquinas' position on this issue is consistent. He claims that nothing cannot be the cause of anything, and thus, since what is, is good insofar as it is, what is good must be the cause of evil. Hence, a defect in the agent is not the cause of evil. However, he maintains that evil is due to a defect of some sort. Finally, note that in section five of chapter fourteen Aquinas tells us that "by the unsuitable character of the matter" it is a cause of evil.

[10]SCG III, C.4, Pegis Trans. Vol III, p.41

In section two Aquinas gives the following argument for the claim evil is not the intended end of any action:

1. If X is the intended end of an act, then X is good.
2. Evil is not good.
3. Therefore, evil is not the intended end of any act.

This argument begs the question.

[11]Davies 94

[12]Davies 86-87

[13]Davies 87

[14]SCG I, C.37, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.150

Here Aquinas argues for the claim God is good. In section one he argues from divine perfection to this conclusion:

1. Goodness and perfection are identical.
2. So, to the extent that a thing is perfect it is good.
3. God is perfect.
4. Consequently, He is good.

As far as I can tell this argument works.

[15]SCG III, C.17, Pegis Trans. Vol III, p.71

Here Aquinas argues for the claim all things are ordered to one final end which is God:

1. All things, when they seek, seek that which is good.
2. So, all ends are good.
3. The higher the good the more things that are ordered to it as an end.
4. Hence, the highest good is that to which all things are ordered.
5. God is the highest good.
6. Consequently, all things are ordered to God.

This argument does not work. For that the highest good must be such that all things are ordered to it does not follow from the porportionality that is set up, namely, the higher the good the more things which are ordered to it as an end. All that really follows from this porportionality is that the highest good has more things ordered to it as an end than any

other end. Yet an end can be such that it has more things ordered to it as an end than any other end and still not be such that all things are ordered to it as an end.

[16]Davies 88.

[17]SCG I, C.38, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.152

For Aquinas, being is identified with goodness. Thus, to the extent that a thing is, it is good. Since God is pure act. Therefore, He just is His act of being, e.g., Being itself. Put another way God, for Aquinas, is what it is to be at all, e.g., being as such. Since being is identified with gooodness, it follows that God just is goodness itself. Aquinas presents this argument in section two of chapter thirty-eight. As far as I can tell, this argument works.

[18]SCG I, C.22, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.118

In section five of chapter twenty-two Aquinas argues for the claim that God's essence is the same as his being from the fact that He is a necessary being:

1. If X exists through its own being; then if X is not its own being, then X is not through itself a necessary being.
2. Now all things that are exist through themselves.
3. So, if X is not its own being, then X is not through itself a necessary being.
4. Hence, if God is not His own being, then He is not through himself a necessary being.
5. But God is through Himself a necessary being.
6. So, God is His own being, which is to say that His essence is the same as His being.

[19] Davies 88

[20]SCG II, C.15, Pegis Trans. Vol II, p.46

Basically in chapter fifteen Aquinas argues that all things derive their being from God. This should be obvious from the fact God is the first cause of all that is. Hence, He is the ultimate cause - where the buck stops so to speak – of the being of all that is. Being the ultimate cause of the being of all that is just is to be the ultimate cause of the goodness of all that is given the identification of being with goodness. Consequently, God is the ultimate cause of the goodness of all that is. Enough said.

[21]SCG I, C.95, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.290

In section three Aquinas argues for the claim that God is not the cause of evil:

1. It is proper for the end of all action to be that which is good. This is so for Aquinas by definition, the good being that which is desired.

2. So, if an agent is the cause of evil, then that agent must be such because of some error on the agent's part e.g., the agent causes evil thinking it to be good.

3. It is not the case that God errs.

4. Hence, God cannot be a cause of evil

Interestingly, elsewhere Aquinas maintains God is the cause of all that is. As such He is the cause of the extent to which things are, and therefore, the extent to which things are not. The extent to which things are not is evil. Therefore, God is the cause of evil.

[22]SCG II, C.7, Pegis Trans. Vol II, p.38

In section two Aquinas gives the following argument for the claim there is power in God:

1. Active power is the capacity to act on another.

2. It is in accordance with God's nature to act on things.

3. So, there is active power in God.

[23]SCG I, C.16, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.100

In section one Aquinas claims that necessarily God does not possess any potentiality since He is eternal.

[24]SCG I, C.20, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.106

In section two Aquinas argues for the claim God is not a body:

1. All bodies, according to Aquinas, are continuums.
2. All continuums are made up of parts.
3. Therefore, all bodies are made up of parts.
4. God has no parts.
5. Consequently, God is not abody.

As far as I can tell, this argument works.

[25]SCG II, C.22, Pegis Trans. Vol II, p.65

Combining sections one and two yields the following argument for God's omnipotence:

1. If a power produces immediately a number of effects and does this not from matter, then that power is not determined to any one particular effect.
2. If a power is not determined to any one particular effect, then it is omnipotent.
3. God, is the frist cause of all things.
4. God creates ex-nihilo.
5. So, God is a power that immediately produces a number of effects and does this not from matter.
6. Hence, God is omnipotent.

I fail to see how the second premise is true.

[26]SCG I, C.75, C.82, C.88, Pegis Trans. Vol I, p.p. 245, 260, and 270

Aquinas claims God creates freely. Yet in chapter seventy-five he argues for the claim "that in willing Himself God also wills other things" and in chapter eighty-two he presents "arguments leading to awkward consequences if God does not necessarily will things other than Himself." However, in chapter eighty-eight he argues for the claim "that in God there is free choice. "What to make of this? I have no idea

[27]Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956) 155.

[28]Gilson 153.

[29]Gilson 153.

[30] Gilson 153-154.,

[31]Frederick Copleston, Aquinas (New York: Penguin, 1991) 154.

[32]John Hick, "Soul-Making and Suffering," The Problem of Evil, ed. Marilyn M. Adams and Robert M Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 168-169.

[33]For a detailed explication of this view see Hick's book, Philosophy of Religion.

[34]Gilson 256.

[35]Davies 239.

[36]Davies 220.

[37]Gilson 237.

[38]Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York: Routledge Press, 1994) 80.

[39]Kenny 87.

[40]Gilson 244-245.

[41]SCG III, C.88, Pegis Trans. Vol IV, p.p. 34-35

Here, Aquinas makes the following claim. "So, the only agent that can cause a movement of the will, without violence, is that which causes an intrinsic principle of this movement, and such a principle is the very power of the will."

[42]Gilson 237.

[43]Gilson 247-248

[44]Norman Kretzmann, "Aquinas's Philosophy of Mind," Philosophical Topics 20.2 ed. Sandra Edwards, (1993): 92-93.

[45]Kenny 77-78.

[46]Kretzmann 93-94.